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EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENTS: A SURVEY AND
ANALYSIS OF PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICE*
Michael D. Carrico**
John T. Bondurant***
An equitable adjustment is a reallocation of assets from the account of one
beneficiary, or from some other person beneficially interested in a trust or estate,
to the account of another to compensate for disproportionate sharing of a tax
burden. Generally, reallocations are made when tax elections by trustees, exe-
cutors, administrators, and other fiduciaries otherwise would have disparate
impacts on beneficiaries. I Since the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, there has been increasing discussion and debate concerning this concept.2
I. INTRODUCTION TO EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENTS
A. Sources in Fiduciary Duty
At least three aspects of fiduciary duty justify equitable adjustments:
1. The duty to minimize the overall tax burden on a trust or estate and its
* This article was a project of the American Bar AssociatioV Section of Taxation's Committee
on Income of Estates and Trusts, and was based in part on a paper written in 1978 by Robert Barlow.
The authors wish to acknowledge the editing of Frank S. Berall and the permission of the American
College of Probate Counsel ("ACPC") to publish the equitable adjustment chart appearing as
Appendix.
** Michael D. Carrico (B.A., Tulane University, 1973; J.D., Yale Law School, 1976) is'an
Assistant Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, and a member of
the California Bar.
*** John T. Bondurant (A.B., University of Kentucky, 1956; LL.B., University of Kentucky,
1960) is a partner in the firm of Brown, Todd & Heybum, Louisville, Kentucky, and a member of
the Kentucky Bar.
I See infra note 15 (listing various tax elections and nonelective procedures discussed in this
article); see also Dobris, Equitable Adjustments in Postmortem Income TaxPlanning: An Unremitting
Diet of Warms, 65 IOWA L. REV. 103, 104, 106-07 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Dobris 1].
2 For early commentary on equitable adjustments required by the changes in estate and trust income
taxation made by the 1954 Code, see Craven, Suggested Revisions of Estate and Trust Income
Taxation, 44 VA. L. REV. 887, 888 (1958). See also Browning, Problems of Fiduciary Accounting,
36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 931, 948-53 (1961); Metzer, The Deduction of an Estate's Administration
Expenses: Section 642(g) of the Internal Revenue Code and Its Impact, 21 TAX L. REV. 459, 487-
93 (1966). See generally J. PRICE, CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING: TEXT AND PROBLEMS §§ 12. 1-
12.43 (1983)(note especially § 12.16; E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 722-806 (3d ed. 1981). For practice oriented discussions, see
Houghton & Lavelle, Important Elements of a Tax Clause, 8 Prob. Notes 154, 158-63 (1982);
Moore, Conflicts in Post-Mortem Planning After the Tax Reform Act, 12 INST. ON EST. PLAN.
600-609 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Moore, Conflicting Interests 1978]; Moore, Conflicting Interests
in Postmortem Planning, 9 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1900-1924 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Moore,
Conflicting Interests 1975]; Weigel & Trost, Tax Elections: When and How To Make Compensatory
Adjustments, 6 EST. PLAN. 130 (1979). See also Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable
Adjustment in Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 IOWA L. REV 273 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Dobris 11]; Dobris I, supra note I.
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beneficiaries. This duty is derived from the duty to conserve trust or estate
property and to make the property reasonably productive.
3
2. The duty of impartiality. A fiduciary has a duty to treat all beneficiaries
fairly and cannot sacrifice the interest of one beneficiary by making a tax election
to favor another.4 Unless the trust settlor, testator, or other transferor specifically
expresses, in a dispositive instrument, his6 intent that the fiduciary elect in a
particular manner, relieving the fiduciary to that extent from the duty of impar-
tiality, the fiduciary generally must allocate tax burdens proportionally among
all beneficiaries.7 Impartiality problems most often arise between present and
future interest holders and have given rise to a range of principal and income
allocation rules,' including the Uniform Principal and Income Act and the Re-
vised Uniform Principal and Income Act, one of which has been adopted by
almost every state. 9
3. The duty not to deal with one's self. This duty bars the fiduciary who is
also a beneficiary from making any tax election unfairly favoring his beneficial
interest over that of another beneficiary. 10
B. Lack of Uniform Approach to Equitable Adjustments
Although often discussed and written about by experts in estate planning and
3 G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF TRUSTS § 101 (5th ed. 1973); 2 A. ScoTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 181 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 176 & 181
(1957). See Taggart, Fiduciary's Liability in Utilizing Post Mortem Estate Planning Techniques, in
POST MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 393, 398 (P. Asofsky ed. 1981); see also id. at 403-10 (discussing
fiduciary liabilities to beneficiaries arising from postmortem estate planning). See generally Conway
& Hale, After Death Tax Planning-Tax Options, 301 T. M. PORTFOLIO A-2 (BNA 1974)(supplemented
through 1981-portfolio withdrawn for revision, November 16, 1981); Dobris I, supra note 1, at
113-16.
1 G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 3, § 106; E. ScoLEs & E. HALBACH, supra note 2, at
802; A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 183; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 183 (1957); see also
Conway & Hale, supra note 3, at A-2 (discussing problem of tax election that shifts tax burden
from one beneficiary to another). See generally Dobris I, supra note 1, at 107-08, 111-13 and 116-
18; Taggart, supra note 3, at 399.
1 Hereinafter any settlor, grantor or trustor, testator, intestate, donor or other transferor will be
referred to simply as a "transferor."
6 Whenever the words "he," "him," "man" or comparable words appear in this article (other
than with obvious reference to named male individuals), they have been used solely to produce a
smooth reading text and are intended to be read in their generic sense (i.e., to include all of mankind,
whether male or female).
7 See 3 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 232 (3d ed. 1967)(duty of trustee to respective beneficiaries
may be controlled by terms of trust); see also Dobris II, supra note 2, at 283-84 (discussing benefits
of express remission or setting aside, in part, of duty of impartiality in dispositive instrument).
I See A. ScoTT, supra note 7, § 232. See generally id. at § 233-241A.
9 See UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT, 7A U.L.A. 464 (1931); REV. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT,
7A U.L.A. 429 (1962) [hereinafter cited as REV. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT]. References to
general principles of principal and income allocation in this article will be to the Revised Act. See
generally Bogert, Uniform Principal and Income Act Revised, 101 TR. & EST. 787 (1962).
'0 While this prohibition on self-dealing is widely accepted (e.g., G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra
note 3, § 95; A. ScoTT, supra note 3, §§ 170-170.25; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170
(1957)), it has not been widely referred to in discussions of equitable adjustments. But see Moore,
Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1916, 1920.
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fiduciary administration, "1 equitable adjustments have received surprisingly little
attention from legislatures, courts, and lawyers not specializing in this field and,
consequently, no uniform practice exists. Commentators have seemed suspended
between the horns of the basic equitable adjustment dilemma: to maximize
fairness to beneficiaries, should equitable adjustments be made whenever pos-
sible, or to maximize simplicity in administration, should they be avoided in the
absence of gross inequities?' 2 To determine equitable adjustment practices, the
American College of Probate Counsel sent a questionnaire to selected attorneys
in each state and the District of Columbia, and compiled a chart from their
responses.' 3 It dramatically confirms the absence of any uniform practice.
C. Purpose and Scope of This Article
This article sets forth and analyzes the precedents and practice in each potential
problem area relating to equitable adjustments and covers the following aspects
of each: (a) the tax law source of the election or nonelective procedure, and how
it works, (b) how the election or procedure affects different beneficiaries' in-
terests-i.e., hurting some and benefitting others, (c) legislative and judicial
" See, e.g., Barton, Post-1976 Tax Clauses: Drafting Burdens and Planning Assignments, 13
INST. ON EST. PLAN. 900-904 (1979); Cornfeld, Trapping Distributions, 14 INST. ON EST. PLAN.
1400-1407 (1980)(paragraph 1405 discusses need for equitable adjustments due to trapping
distributions); see also Dobris I, supra note 1, at 105. For further reading, consult, for example,
the Practicing Law Institute's annual volume, POST MoRTEm ESTATE PLANNING, edited by P. Asofsky,
and the commentary cited in supra note 2.
12 In 1979, Professor Joel C. Dobris made the following observation:
The cases dealing with equitable adjustments come from states where there is a tradition
of creating trusts and paying close attention to the niceties of fiduciary administration....
[Their] impact . . . on fiduciary action and on the advice given by estates lawyers is
unknown, but is likely to be widespread. The jurisdictions where the cases are decided,
and the fact that virtually all are lower court decisions, are not as important as they might
seem, because [equitable adjustment] cases are read as a single body of law by lawyers,
judges, and commentators. [But wihile certain equitable adjustments have gained accep-
tance, a clear rationale for making adjustments has yet to emerge.
Dobris I, supra note 1, at 105 (emphasis added).
Despite the lack of uniform practice, Dobris concluded that equitable adjustments are appropriate
not only when exercise of a discretionary fiduciary power causes inequitable allocation of a tax
burden, but also when such an allocation is caused by exercise of a nondiscretionary power. Id. at
148-49. In 1981, however, he reached a somewhat different conclusion:
[F]aimess does not entitle beneficiaries to have a perfectly proportional relationship with
the estate and each other. Therefore, fiduciaries need not adjust when it is too complicated,
expensive, time consuming, or when the imposition is minimal or conjectural. The average
transferor wants his . . . fiduciary to make reasonable efforts to obtain tax savings and to
give reasonable consideration to all beneficial interests before exercising discretionary
powers and allocating receipts and expenditures. When feasible, the average transferor
also wants equitable apportionments to cure the gross inequities deriving from estate
administration. . ..
Existing equitable adjustments are likely to be required in more jurisdictions. However,
courts are unlikely to require additional adjustments unless changes in the tax law occur,
and gross inequities arise from those changes. The interest in simplicity is too strong.
Dobris II, supra note 2, at 340-41 (emphasis added).
"3 See ACPC chart infra at Appendix.
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responses to the problem, and (d) possible drafting responses, ranging from
prohibiting adjustments to granting the fiduciary complete discretion to make
adjustments and exculpating the fiduciary from liability for any resulting harm.
The article discusses tax elections and nonelective procedures which primarily
affect the fiduciary income tax return; for example, the fiduciary election to
deduct administration expenses and casualty losses on the fiduciary return under
section 642(g) or on the estate tax return under sections 2053 and 2054 14 and
the nonelective deduction of principal expenses on the fiduciary income tax
return that sometimes causes capital gains taxation of principal beneficiaries.' 5
The article also discusses elections and procedures affecting the decedent's final
income and gift tax returns and the federal estate tax return. 16 Finally, the article
discusses extralegal methods of achieving beneficiary agreement on adjustment
14 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 19-91 (election to take administrative expense and
casualty loss deductions either on fiduciary income tax return or on estate tax return). This article
also discusses the following elections and nonelective tax procedures: (1) the election to make
principal distributions that carry out distributable net income ("DNI" is defined infra note 92) and
shift income tax burdens from income to principal beneficiaries, see infra text accompanying notes
122-47; (2) the election to deduct depreciation on the fiduciary income tax return, reducing income
beneficiaries' and increasing principal beneficiaries' income tax burdens, see infra text accompanying
notes 148-73; (3) the election to make d:sproportionate distributions of both income and principal
to satisfy pecuniary or residuary gifts in kind, thus creating disproportionate income tax burdens for
the beneficiaries, see infra text accompanying notes 174-214; (4) the selection of the estate or trust
taxable year, see infra text accompanying notes 215-21; (5) the decision to sell assets, and the timing
of such sales, see infra text accompanying notes 222-29; (6) the election to pay an estate's income
tax in installments, see infra text accompanying notes 230-32; (7) the election to terminate subchapter
S elections, see infra text accompanying notes 233-42; and (8) the selection of the year for either
final distribution of an estate or termination of a trust, and the possible disproportionate sharing of
advantages or disadvantages from distributing excess deductions, loss carryovers and capital gains,
see infra text accompanying notes 243-46.
'5 See infra text accompanying notes 92-121.
16 This article discusses the following elections and nonelective procedures that primarily affect
the decedent's final income tax return: (1) the election to accrue series "E" and "EE" savings bond
interest, see infra text accompanying notes 247-53; (2) the election to deduct medical expenses, see
infra text accompanying notes 254-60; and (3) the election to file the decedent's final income tax
return jointly with the surviving spouse, see infra text accompanying notes 261-71. The following
federal estate tax elections and procedures affect inclusion in the gross estate: (1) decisions regarding
inclusion of assets in the gross estate under sections 2033, 2036-2038, 2040(a), 2041 and 2042, see
infra text accompanying notes 272-78; and (2) the election to include a distribution from a qualified
employee benefit plan or individual retirement account under section 2039(c), (f) and (g), see infra
text accompanying notes 279-88. The following federal estate tax elections and procedures affect
valuation of assets: (1) the election to use the alternate valuation date under section 2032, see infra
text accompanying notes 289-96; and (2) the election 'to value a farm or closely held business real
property based on its actual use under section 2032A, see infra text accompanying notes 297-307.
The following federal estate tax elections affect payment of estate tax: (1) to tender closely held
corporate stock for redemption under section 303 and to use the proceeds to pay death taxes and
other qualified expenses, see infra text accompanying notes 308-10; (2) to defer estate tax payment
automatically under section 6166, see infra text accompanying notes 311-23; and (3) to defer estate
tax payment on remainder interests under section 6163 or to request discretionary deferral of estate
tax payments under section 6161, see infra text accompanying notes 324-27. This article also
discusses the federal gift tax election to split gifts with the surviving spouse on the decedent's final
gift tax returns under section 2513. See infra text accompanying notes 328-31. Finally, the article
discusses the analogous equitable reimbursement sometimes made to settlors of short-term rever-
sionary interest trusts for capital gains tax liability under section 677. See infra text accompanying
notes 332-40.
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problems, pointing out the variety of obstacles to reaching valid consensual
beneficiary adjustment. 7 The article, however, deals only indirectly with tax
election issues arising under The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and later
legislation. 8
II. EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF PARTICULAR EQUITABLE
ADJUSTMENTS
A. Election to Take Administration. Expense and Casualty Loss Deductions on
the Fiduciary Income Tax Return or on the Estate Tax Return
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Under section 2053, an executor 9 may deduct from the decedent's gross estate
funeral expenses, creditors' claims, administration expenses, and certain mort-
gage obligations (which are duly allowed and paid under local law). 20 Under
section 2054 he may deduct any uninsured losses during administration from
"fires, storms, shipwrecks, or other casualties, or from theft." 2' Alternatively,
under section 642(g) an executor may elect to deduct administration expenses
and casualty losses on the fiduciary income tax return for the taxable year in
which the expenses are paid, or in which the losses are incurred, so long as they
would be deductible for income tax purposes 22 (e.g., as section 212 expenses
to produce investment income and as section 165 casualty losses) and the executor
files a statement that such amounts have not been or will not be taken as de-
ductions on the estate tax return. 23 The disallowance of double deductions under
17 See infra text accompanying notes 341-47.
18 After regulations are proposed, the authors intend to devote another article to such elections
under, for example, the "qualified terminable interest" property provisions of sections 2056(b)(7)
and 2523(f). See, e.g., The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95
Stat. 172, 301 [hereinafter cited as ERTA]; Temp. Regs. § 22.2056-1, 47 Fed. Reg. 41736 (1982);
see also Moore, Conflicting Interests in Estate Planning after ERTA: Recognition and Resoluti6n,
17 INST. ON EST. PLAN. (preliminary outline, to be published Summer 1983); Strauss, Qualified
Terminable Interest Property Offers New Opportunities But Many Problems Are Unresolved, 9 EST.
PLAN. 74, 80 (1982).
"9 According to section 6018, the estate tax return must be filed by the "executor." Under
Regulations section 20.6018-2, however, this term can refer to an administrator, to multiple executors
or administrators, and to "every person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the
decedent." Regs. § 20.6018-2. Thus, a trustee of a revocable trust (a will substitute) may make
elections affecting the property to which he has legal title if there is no duly appointed executor
serving at the time. See id. (if executor cannot make tax return on any property, then person holding
legal or beneficial interest in that property must make return upon notice from District Director);
see also I.R.C. § 2203; Regs. § 20.2203-1 ("person in actual or constructive possession of property
of' decedent" includes decedent's agents and representatives, safe-deposit companies, warehouse
companies, other custodians of property in United States, brokers holding decedent's debtors in
United States). Hereinafter all references to "executors" making elections should be understood to
refer to any fiduciary designated under section 6018, unless otherwise specifically indicated.
20 I.R.C. § 2053(a)(1), (2), (4); Regs. §§ 20.2053-1, -3, -8; Regs. § 20.2053-7.
21 I.R.C. § 2054; Regs. § 20.2054-1.
22 I.R.C. § 642(g); Regs. § 1.642(g)-I.
23 According to Regulations section 1.642(g)-I, amounts allowable under sections 2053 or 2054
as a deduction in computing the taxable estate of a decedent may not be allowed as a deduction (or
as an offset against the sale price of property in determining gain or loss) in computing the taxable
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section 642(g) does not apply to deductions in respect of decedents (described
in section 691(b)). 24 Furthermore, an executor may elect to take deductible
expenses as income tax deductions in one year and not in another, and in any
particular year may elect to deduct on the income tax return only a portion of
such amounts paid that year, deducting the rest on the estate tax return.
25
Unless the transferor expressly directs to the contrary, administration expenses
and casualty losses are charged against principal of the trust or estate, even if
deduction of these items on the fiduciary income tax return reduces the income
beneficiaries' tax burden. 26 Estate tax, including any increase resulting from not
deducting these expenses and losses on the estate tax return, ordinarily is paid
from principal, while fiduciary income tax, other than capital gains tax, is paid
from income. 27 The fiduciary trying to minimize total taxes compares marginal
income and estate tax rates and, if the income tax rate is higher, deducts sufficient
administration expenses and casualty losses on the income tax return to equalize,
in so far as is possible, the two marginal rates.2" Thus, this bracket equalization
can shift the tax saving effect of the deductions from the principal beneficiaries,
income of the estate or of any other person (e.g., a will substitute trust) unless there is "filed a
statement, in duplicate, to the effect that the items have not been allowed as deductions from the
gross estate . . . and that all rights to have such items allowed at any time as deductions ... are
waived." The statement must be filed "before the expiration of the statutory period of limitation
applicable to the taxable year for which the deduction is sought." See generally I.R.C. § 6501
(regarding limitation periods). Thus, claiming an amount as a deduction on the estate tax return does
not preclude also deducting the amount on the income tax return, "so long as the estate tax deduction
is not finally allowed and the statement is filed [before the limitation period expires]." Regs.
§ 1.642(g)-I. Of course, if the statement and waiver have been filed, the amount cannot then be
deducted on the estate tax return. Id. But see Prop. Regs. § 1.642(g)-l(a)(2), 48 Fed. Rog. 5762,
5763 (1983). Under this proposed regulation, the statement must waive the right to deduct such
items if an estate tax return has not yet been filed. If an estate tax return deducting such items under
sections 2053 and 2054 has been filed, the statement "should be filed no later than 180 days prior
to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations upon assessment and collection of the estate
tax"; otherwise the income tax deduction may not be taken until the estate tax deductions are "no
longer claimed," or have been disallowed and "any resulting deficiency has been timely assessed."
But cf. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B)(regarding casualty losses: "No [casualty loss otherwise deductible on
the fiduciary income tax return] shall be allowed if, at the time of filing the return, such loss has
been claimed . . . in the estate tax return'")(emphasis added). The Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act of 1982 § 203, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 203, 96 Stat. 324, 422 [hereinafter cited as
TEFRA]; see also I.R.C. § 641(b); Regs. § 1.641(b)-l (1956)(stating general rule on deductions
allowable to estates and trusts). See generally Probate and Trust Law Committee on Postmortem
Estate and Tax Planning, Section of Real Property, American Bar Association, Deduction of Ad-
ministration Expenses Updated, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 382-97 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Postmortem Estate and Tax Planning Committee]; King, Alternative Treatment of Administration
Expenses, in POST MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 147-56 (P. Asofsky ed. 1981).
24 The last sentence of I.R.C. section 642(g) states as follows: "This subsection shall not apply
with respect to deductions allowed under Part II (relating to income in respect of decedents)." See
also Regs. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956); infra note 88. See generally J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.12.
25 Regs. § 1.642(g)-2.
26 See REv. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT, supra note 9, §§ 5(a), 13(a)(6).
27 Id. §§ 5(a), 13(a)(6), (c)(4), (c)(5).
28 Dobris 1, supra note 1, at 121-22; see also Barton, supra note I1, 902.2; Conway & Hale,
supra note 3, at A-14; Post Mortem Estate and Tax Planning Committee, supra note 23, at 392-93;
J. PRICE, supra note 2, §§ 12.11-12.16.
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who bear the burden of the expenses or losses, to the income beneficiaries, who
in essence receive a windfall.
2. Legislative Responses
Although this election has an impact on any trust or estate paying both income
and estate taxes, it appears that the principal and income allocation rules of only
three states take it into account:
a. New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, Section 11-1.2. New York has
codified the rule of In re Estate of Warms 29 to compensate principal beneficiaries
for a portion of the economic harm caused by taking the deductions on the
income tax return. The statutory formula reads as follows:
[E]ach person, including the estate or any trust, who has .. the use of such
income tax deductions shall reimburse to the principal chargeable with such
increased estate taxes an amount determined by multiplying such increase in
estate taxes by a fraction having a numerator equal to the income tax deduction
made available to him as the result of the aforesaid election and a denominator
equal to the total amount of the income tax deductions made available thereby. 30
Thus, principal beneficiaries are compensated only for the increase in estate
taxes and can receive substantially less than the deduction's value to income
beneficiaries. 3 Finally, the statute states that a testator may expressly provide
that no adjustment be made. 32
b. Connecticut General Statutes Annotated, Section 45-100e(35)(B). Con-
necticut takes a different approach to the problem. It permits incorporation by
reference in wills and trusts of certain specified fiduciary powers,33 one of which
directs the fiduciary to claim "certain administration expenses, casualty losses
• ..and other expenses" on the tax return which will "result in the lowest total
taxes being paid by the estate and its beneficiaries, regardless of whether such
expenses may be payable from the income or principal of such estate."- 34 An
adjustment is required only if "federal estate taxes paid from and chargeable to
• ..principal are greater than if the contrary election had been made," in which
case the difference in estate tax is reimbursed to principal from income (producing
a result identical to New York's) or if the will or trust provides for a "preresiduary
marital ...deduction formula" gift followed by a residuary charitable gift.35
29 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1955). See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text
(discussing Warms).
30 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § I l-1.2(A)(McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
31 Cf. In re Estate of Warms, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 170-71; see also Dobris I, supra note 1, at 123
(providing possible rationale for rule expressed in Warms). New York Estates, Powers & Trusts
Law section 1 l-1.2(B)(1) provides that no adjustment be made for an increase in a marital deduction
formula gift caused by an increase in the amount of the adjusted gross estate because of taking such
expenses as estate tax deductions. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.2 (B)(l)(McKinney
Supp. 1982-83); see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
32 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1 I-1.2(A), (B)(i)(McKinney Supp. 1982-83). The statute
makes no reference to equitable adjustment (nor does it have an express. provision that no such
adjustment shall be made) if the gift is made in revocable trust instead of by will.
33 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100d (West 1981).
34 Id. § 45-100e(35)(B)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
35 Id. A residuary charitable gift must be to an organization qualifying under I.R.C. section 501(c).
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In no other situation is the fiduciary required to make an adjustment.3 6 Connecticut's
statutory power must be incorporated by reference for it to apply at all, whereas in
New York the adjustment power exists unless a will specifies to the contrary.
c. Maryland Estates and Trusts Code, Section 11-106. The Maryland approach
is more like that of New York, requiring adjustment, without incorporation by
reference of a statutory power, in "an amount equal to the difference in estate
taxes . . . to principal from the income of the trust or other assets," unless the
transferor expressly directs to the contrary in the dispositive instrument.37
3. Judicial Responses
All of these legislative responses arose from the 1955 New York Surrogate's
Court decision In re Estate of Warms.38 In that case, the principal beneficiary had
claimed, alternatively: (1) the entire amount of administration expenses paid from
principal, because they had been deducted on the fiduciary income tax return, or
(2) the difference in estate tax liability, also paid from principal, caused by not
taking those expenses on the estate tax return. Surrogate Frankenthaler granted only
the latter relief:
Ordinary administration expenses . are generally payable from principal....
[T]he source of payment ... does not change because of the fact that in the
computation of taxes the expense was charged to income rather than to principal.
The option granted by the Internal Revenue Code to the executors ... cannot affect
the propriety of the charge of administration expenses to principal ....
[T]he special guardian does not object to the income beneficiary retaining any amount
in excess of the saving in estate tax .... The tax option which results in a benefit
to the income beneficiary, especially where she is co-executrix, should not be
exercised to the detriment of the remaindermen. The remainder interest is entitled
to the benefits which would have resulted if the expense with which it is charged
had been deducted on the estate tax return. The question which would have arisen
if the executors had no option but would have had to deduct from income taxes an
expense otherwise chargeable to principal need not here be decided. 39
Thus, Warms contains three important rulings: (a) principal beneficiaries cannot
Connecticut General Statutes Annotated section 45-100e(35)(B) also refers to a preresiduary orphans'
deduction formula gift; this reference only applies to estates of decedents dying between 1976 and
1982, under wills and trusts that incorporated this power, because the I.R.C. section 2057 orphans'
deduction was repealed by ERTA, supra note 18, § 427.
36 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(B)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
37 MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(a), (b)(1)(1974). The Maryland provision is similar
to those of New York and Connecticut in not requiring an adjustment for an increase in the amount
of a marital deduction formula gift because an election increases the amount of the "adjusted gross
estate" subject to the formula gift. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(b)(1)(1974). See
generally infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. Thus, the three state legislatures which have
addressed this adjustment problem have solved it in similar, though not entirely identical, ways.
There appears to have been no effort to draft uniform legislation in this area.
38 140 N.Y.S.2d 169. See supra text accompanying note 29. Accord In re Will of Backus, 106
Misc. 2d 463, 434 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980); In re Will of Coe, 80 Misc. 2d
374, 363 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1975); In re Will of Dupuy, 29 A.D.2d 965, 289
N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1968). See also Dobris I, supra note I, at 122-23.
39 140 N.Y.S.2d at 170-71.
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have such administration expenses charged to income; (b) principal beneficiaries
may be reimbursed for their economic harm (i.e., for the increase in estate tax
resulting from the election); and (c) this is not the same issue as that arising
from economic harm suffered by principal beneficiaries because of a nonelective
tax procedure.
Although the Warms solution usually does not result in a pro rata sharing of
the total tax benefit to the estate and its beneficiaries, but only in a reduction in
the disproportionately large estate tax burden borne by principal beneficiaries,
the Warms case did inspire the New York, Connecticut, and Maryland statutes
and has been followed by courts in several other states:
a. California. In Estate of Bixby,40 but for the Warms adjustment, the income
beneficiary's $100,000 income tax saving would have cost the principal bene-
ficiary about $60,000 in estate taxes. 41
b. Florida. In In re Kent's Estate,42 a routine Warms adjustment was ap-
proved.43 In In re Veith's Estate,' the adjustment was made for the benefit of
charitable residuary beneficiaries.4 5
c. Pennsylvania. In re Bell's Estate4 6 involved a fairly straightforward ap-
plication of the Warms approach.
47
d. Rhode Island. In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v. Sanders,
4 8
adjustment was ordered under facts similar to those in the Florida case, In re
Veith's Estate.4
9
4. Drafting Solutions
Based on the ACPC chart, attorneys in six of the states discussed above 50
should be aware that in the absence of express provision to the contrary in the
dispositive instrument, and barring peculiar circumstances, principal benefici-
aries should be compensated for at least the increase in estate tax caused by
deducting administration expenses and casualty losses on the fiduciary income
tax return. 5 1 Connecticut fiduciaries are governed by no such statutory or judicial
direction, but the incorporation by reference provision may be read as a strong
hint to make a Warms adjustment. Nine of the other forty-four jurisdictions have
local practices dealing with these adjustments 2.5 Even in these jurisdictions there
40 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 295 P.2d at 68 (1956).
41 Id. at 336, 295 P.2d at 74-75.
42 23 Fla. Supp. 133 (Palm Beach County Ct. 1964).
43 Id. at 136.
" 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Dade County Ct. 1965).
45 Id. at 148-50.
46 8 Ches. Co. 21 (Orphans' Ct. 1956), affd, 393 Pa. 623, 628 (1958).
47 Id. at 32.
48 84 R.I. 347, 125 A.2d 100 (1956).
49 Id. at 353-55, 125 A.2d at 103-05.
50 California, Florida, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
51 See ACPC chart, infra at Appendix, question L.a. Rhode Island and Pennsylvania appear to
be members of this group. But see ACPC chart, infra at Appendix, nn.70a and 71.
52 According to the ACPC chart, infra at Appendix, question 1 .b., nine other states have local
practices for making such adjustments, despite their lack of statutory or case law rules: Colorado;
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is uncertainty as to whether the adjustments are necessary and, therefore, how
they should be handled in drafting and postmortem planning. 53 Attorneys in those
six states with statutory rules or judicial precedent must decide whether to provide
a specific expression of contrary intent.
There are at least four reasonable ways to draft an instrument regarding this
adjustment:
1. Include a formula or other mechanical procedure;
2. Require adjustment in the fiduciary's discretion;
3. Prohibit it; or
4. Say nothing about it, leaving it to the courts or legislature to guide the
fiduciary.54
The first option alone involves at least three different types of reasonable for-
mulae: (a) the fiduciary must reimburse principal in accordance with Warms:
income beneficiaries, or the fiduciary on their behalf, would pay the principal
account the lesser of the amount by which the estate tax is increased or the
amount by which the income tax is reduced; (b) the fiduciary must reimburse
principal for the entire income tax reduction; or (c) the fiduciary can use option
(a) and reimburse the principal account for a portion of the additional economic
benefit to the income beneficiaries, perhaps splitting that benefit equally between
income and principal. 55
Requiring the adjustment under a formula is probably appropriate only when
the draftsman anticipates relatively simple fiduciary income tax returns. 56 Many
unanswered questions concerning these adjustments remain, however, and per-
haps no such return may reasonably be considered simple; for instance, it is far
from settled whether an adjustment to the principal account constitutes income
(for income tax purposes) to principal beneficiaries. 57
If discretionary adjustments are directed, the transferor should exculpate the
fiduciary broadly from liability for any loss caused by the adjustment and should
make clear that no beneficiary has the right to a particular adjustment. The
Georgia, but see infra at Appendix, n.28; Illinois, but see infra at Appendix, n.29; Kentucky;
Massachusetts; Nevada, but see infra at Appendix, n.48; North Carolina, but see infra at Appendix,
n.58; Oregon, but see infra at Appendix, n.68; Wyoming, but see infra at Appendix, n.80.
53 Cf. Dobris II, supra note 2, at 284-90 (remissions implied in fact). But see Dobris I, supra
note 1, at 125 (Warms was obvious situation for equitable adjustment); Weigel & Trost, supra note
2, at 132.
54 Metzer, supra note 2, at 493.
55 Id. at 488-89. See also Dobris I, supra note 1, at 143-48. According to Professor Dobris, only
option (c) comes close to splitting equitably the economic benefit from the tax election among all
beneficiaries-his theory for such an adjustment is that all beneficiaries have a de facto "property
right" in the economic benefit and that principal beneficiaries, to be compensated fully for the loss
of that benefit, should receive a portion of the benefit equal to the proportion that the economic or
present value of their interests bears to the economic or present value of all beneficiaries' interests.
56 Weigel & Trost, supra note 2, at 135.
57 Cf. Britenstool v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 711 (1966), acq., Rev. Rul. 78-445, 1978-2 C.B.
242. Compare the discussion of possible income characterization of reimbursements to principal on
account of trapping distributions in Conway & Hale, After-Death Tax Planning-Payments and
Distributions, 302 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) at A-18 (1976, supplemented through 1981-
portfolio withdrawn for revision, November 16, 1981) with Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra
note 2, 1918.
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problem with such exculpation is that a court may read it narrowly 58 or, con-
ceivably, may view it as negating the fiduciary's duty to make any adjustment.
A New York case, In re Estate of LeCompte,59 supports the basic enforceability
of such a broad discretionary power, so long as the circumstances show that
"there [are] sound reasons" to give the fiduciary power to make an adjustment
"for an equitable allocation of ... taxes.'"6 In that case, however, the question
of exactly how to exercise such a discretionary power was not addressed.6 1
Prohibiting adjustment may be the simplest course of all. In light of possible
economic distortion of the various beneficiaries' interests, however, this simple
solution may result in frustration of the transferor's original dispositive intent. 62
If the fiduciary is also a beneficiary, the election necessarily involves a conflict
of interest.63 Three possible ways to draft an instrument in view of this problem
are as follows:
a. Do not permit any beneficiary to be a fiduciary authorized to make the
election. Perhaps the instrument should even bar a beneficiary from serving as
a successor to such a fiduciary.' 4
b. Specifically recognize the existence of the conflict and either abrogate for
that purpose the fiduciary's general duty not to self-deal or give reasonable
guidelines for such elections,65 using language compatible with a grant of dis-
cretion to make adjustments.'
c. Set out a rigid formula for such adjustments, denying the fiduciary any
58 See A. ScoTT, supra note 7, §§ 222, 222.2 (strict construction of exculpatory provisions in
trust instruments). Grants of "absolute" discretion also tend to be read narrowly, see, e.g., Estate
of Collins, 72 Cal.App.3d 663, 672-74 (1977); see also Metzer, supra note 2, at 493; Weigel &
Trost, supra note 2, at 135. See generally G. BOGERT & G.BOERT, supra note 3, § 94 (discussing
exculpatory or immunity clauses).
59 52 Misc. 2d 549, 276 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
60 Id. at 552, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 211-12.
61 Id. at 552, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 212. In re Will of Backus, 106 Misc. 2d 463,434 N.Y.S.2d 106
(Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980), however, indicates that as long as there is "no abuse of discretion
by the . . . fiduciary as afforded under the decedent's will," a discretionary adjustment will be
approved. Id. at 467, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
62 See Weigel & Trost, supra note 2, at 130-35; see also Taggart, Adjustments Required When
Tax Elections Alter Interests Among Beneficiaries, in POST MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 219, 224-27
(P. Asofsky ed. 1981).
63 Moore states:
Certainly whenever beneficiaries are also acting as fiduciaries, the instrument should either
state that equitable adjustments should not be made or that they should be made. Any
beneficiary who is also a fiduciary may well have a conflict of interest in deciding whether
or not to make an adjustment. By making the adjustment he might benefit himself, or by
failing to make the adjustment, he might benefit himself, and if nothing is said in the
instrument, he is placed squarely in this unfortunate position-he should either be told to
make adjustments or not to make adjustments.
Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1920. See also id. 1916.
64 Id. 1920.
65 See, e.g., In re Estate of Colp, 175 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 20, 1976). Cf. In
re Fiedler's Estate, 55 N.J. Super. 500, 151 A.2d 201 (App. Div. 1959). See generally Taggart,
supra note 62, at 254.
66 See Metzer, supra note 2, at 493.
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discretion, and structure the adjustment so as not to benefit the fiduciary as an
individual, in effect penalizing the beneficiary for his fiduciary status.
67
When counselling a fiduciary, an attorney should consider advising him to
obtain court instructions before exercising any discretion with respect to an
adjustment. There is authority, however, that judicial intervention is only ap-
propriate after the fiduciary has complied with the transferor's intent and already
has made an adjustment decision. 68 After such an adjustment has or has not been
made, nothing should bar the anxious fiduciary from filing an account with the
court specifically describing the adjustment (or failure to adjust), thereby ob-
taining judicial approval of his decision. 69 This technique is particularly important
for a beneficiary who is also the fiduciary.
5. Special Difficulties with the Administration Expense and Casualty Loss
Deduction Election
a. Adjustments Between Marital and Nonmarital Beneficiaries Because of
Marital Deduction Formula Gifts. At this point one adjustment problem relating
to the administration expense and casualty loss election deserves special mention.
Since 1948, a married person has been able to transfer to his spouse a certain
amount of property free of federal estate or gift tax.7" Section 205671 has per-
mitted deduction from the gross estate of the following amounts of qualifying
property: from 1948 through 1976, up to one-half of the adjusted gross estate;72
from 1977 through 1981, the greater of $250,000 or one-half of the adjusted
gross estate, with certain adjustments for lifetime gifts to the spouse; and after
1981, an unlimited amount.73 Clearly, the election to deduct administration
expenses and casualty losses on the fiduciary income tax return or the estate tax
67 Moore approves of this approach. Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1920.
68 In re Will of Raible, 177 N.Y.L.J. 14 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County May 10, 1977); In re Estate
of Colp, 176 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County January 20, 1976). See Moore, Conflicting Interests
1978, supra note 2, 605.3.
69 Such approval can be obtained by the fiduciary as a matter of right once any fiduciary power
has been exercised. See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 3, § 143; E. SCOLES & E.
HALBACH, supra note 2, at 620-29.
70 I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523. See I.R.C. §§ 812(e), 1004(a)(3)(1939); See also Berall, Marital De-
duction Planning, 2 NOTRE DAME EST. PLAN. INST. 183, 184-85 (1978)(brief history of marital
deduction); Dobris II, supra note 2, at 290-95 (summary of transfer taxation of interspousal gifts).
7' The 1939 Code predecessor of section 2056 (1954) was section 812(e).
72 For the deduction amount from 1948 to 1976, see section 2056(c), as originally enacted, and
its predecessor, I.R.C. § 812(e)(I)(h)(1939), as enacted by the Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No.
471, § 361(a), 62 Stat. 110. The adjusted gross estate was computed by subtracting from the gross
estate amounts deductible under sections 2053 and 2054. See I.R.C. § 2056(c)(2), prior to 1982.
This portion of section 2056 (and the parallel portion of section 2523) was repealed by ERTA section
403, because the concept is superfluous if no limit is placed on the deduction for qualifying property
"passing" to the surviving (or donee) spouse. ERTA, supra note 18, § 403.
13 For the deduction amount from 1977 to 1981, see section 2056(c), as amended by Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1854. See generally Kurtz, The Impact
of the Revenue Act of 1978 and the 1976 TaxReform Act on Estate Tax Marital Deduction Formulas,
64 IOWA L. REV. 739 (1976). For the current, unlimited deduction amount, see ERTA, supra note
18, § 403(a). For the definitive explanation of section 403 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, see the JOINT COMMITIEE ON TAXATION'S GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY
TAX ACT OF 1981, published December 29, 1981 I hereinafter cited as GENERAL EXPLANATION].
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return affects both marital and nonmarital gift beneficiaries when the size of the
marital gift depends on the maximum marital deduction or the size of the estate
after such deduction. 7 4 Sometimes referred to as the "swing" between the marital
and nonmarital gifts, 75 under the current unlimited marital deduction, this shift
could equal the full value of the income tax deductions taken. When there is an
unlimited marital deduction gift and administration expenses are deducted on
the income tax return, this shift can result in estate tax liability when there might
otherwise be none.76
Surprisingly, no statutory response has required an adjustment. 77 The cases
found discussing this question have not required adjustment, except for a New
York case, In re Estate of Levy, 78 which was overruled to some extent by New
7" The critical requirement under section 2056 is that amounts deducted actually "pass" to the
surviving or donee spouse. See I.R.C. § 2056(c). Nowhere in the list contained in that subsection
is there any mention of disbursements for administration expenses and the like. For general infor-
mation on such formula gifts, see R. COVEY, THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND THE USE OF FORMULA
PROVISIONS (2d ed. 1978); D. WESTFALL, ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION 12.05 (1981);
Dobris II, supra note 2, at 291.
7- According to Professor Dobris, this term was first used in Bronston, Elections and Discretions
Under the Code: The Executor's Dilemma, 35 TAXES 986, 988 (1957). Dobris II, supra note 2, at
294 n. 143.
76 This discussion is not necessarily predicated on the transferor using a maximum marital deduction
formula gift. See generally I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505. Spouses owning combined property exceeding,
but less than double, the unified credit amount might make optimal use of the unified credit as
follows: the credit amount might be given to a trustee, with only income and limited principal powers
to the surviving spouse, and the remainder of the decedent's property might be given to the surviving
spouse in a manner qualifying for the marital deduction. Other transferors might use a maximum
marital deduction formula gift, with the proviso that its amount be reduced to the minimum necessary
to produce no estate tax liability for the decedent spouse's estate. With either type of plan, the
election to deduct administration expenses and casualty losses on the fiduciary income tax return
could alter the amount going to the surviving spouse.
7 The New York statute provides:
Unless otherwise expressly provided by a will under which a disposition is made to or for
the benefit of the surviving spouse of a decedent which qualifies for an estate tax marital
deduction under any tax law of the state of New York or of the United States and the
amount or size of such disposition is defined by the will in terms of the maximum marital
deduction allowable under such tax law:
(1) No adjustment shall be required to be made between such disposition and the other
interests in the decedent's estate by reason of (A) any increase in the amount or size of
such disposition resulting from any election by the fiduciary, under such tax laws, to treat
estate administration expenses as income tax deductions over the amount or size of such
disposition had the contrary election been made . ...
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1 l-l.2(B)(McKinney Supp. 1982-83). See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-100e(35)(B)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(b)(1974).
The Maryland statute explicitly applies to gifts under nontestamentary "controlling instrument[s]."
If incorporated by reference into the instrument, see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text, the
Connecticut statute provides that "the fiduciary . . . is not required to make adjustments between
income or principal or between the property interests passing to any beneficiaries which may be
affected on account of such election," except when "one or more residuary legatees . . . is a
charitable organization" under I.R.C. section 501(c) and the election results in greater estate tax
being paid.
7s 9 Misc. 2d 561, 563-64, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18-19 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1957). But see In
re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145, 150 (Dade County Ct. 1965)(discussed infra text accompanying
80-81).
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York's statutory formula and has been distinguished in several subsequent New
York cases.7 9 In the leading Florida case, In re Veith's Estate, 0 the court refused
to require an adjustment, finding that a testator using a maximum marital deduction
formula clause partially remits the duty of impartiality: "If this is inequitable, it is
an inequity created by the testator himself."'"
Thus, there is a relatively clear rule that no adjustment is required. Even so, the
dispositive instrument probably should negate the duty to make the adjustment,
perhaps by granting the fiduciary the broadest possible discretion to make the election
or even by directing the fiduciary not to make the adjustment or election. There
are three reasons for prohibiting adjustment: (1) if the adjustment is from nonmarital
beneficiaries to the surviving spouse, the adjustment amount could be deemed to
not have "passed" from the decedent and hence may not qualify for the marital
deduction;82 (2) assuming an adjustmentfrom the surviving spouse, this may frustrate
the intention of the decedent to transfer as much as possible to the surviving spouse;
83
and (3) authorizing the fiduciary to make the adjustment may unreasonably increase
the complexity and expense of administration. 84 Given the lack of any current
statutory or case law rule favoring the adjustment, using a surviving spouse (or
interested nonmarital beneficiary) as fiduciary should not raise a self-dealing prob-
lem. Notwithstanding this lack and the probability that the surviving spouse will
be the preferred fiduciary in most estate plans, the conservative draftsman might
consider having someone else serve.
b. No Implicit Direction to Maximize the Value of a Maximum Marital Deduction
Formula Gift. A related issue is whether the transferor's expressed intention that
the surviving spouse receive the maximum marital deduction amount directs the
fiduciary to take these deductions on the fiduciary income tax return (to increase
the portion of the estate available to fund the formula gift).85 Connecticut's statutory
powers, if incorporated by reference into an instrument, and the New York and
Maryland statutes specifically negate any such duty to maximize the spouse's gift. 
86
No cases were found directly on point. Therefore, as was true for the marital
79 E.g., In re McTarnahan's Estate, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 14-15, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619-20 (Sur. Ct.
N.Y. County 1960); In re Estate of Inman, 22 Misc. 2d 573, 577, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369, 373 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1959).
80 26 Fla. Supp. 145, 150 (Dade County Ct. 1965).
1 1 d. at 150. See Dobris II, supra note 2, at 300.
82 Compare First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 778 (D. Minn. 1975) with
Empire Trust Co. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 623, 627-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See generally
Taggart, supra note 62, at 228-30.
83 See Dobris 11, supra note 2, at 302; id. at 284-86 (equitable adjustment not required when will
implies setting aside of impartiality duty); see also Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note
2, 1902, 1920.
8 If the fiduciary is to have discretion as to whether to make the adjustment, the planner or
draftsman theoretically must present the transferor with a whole range of administration expense
and casualty loss figures, which might not be deducted on the fiduciary income tax return and
thereby might reduce the amount of property available to fund the marital share. See generally
Dobris II, supra note 2, at 302, 330-32.
s5 See generally Dobris II, supra note 2, at 301.
86 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(B)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982); MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. § I 1-106(c)(1974); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § I I-l.2(B)(2)(McKinney 1969
and Supp. 1982-83).
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deduction formula gift problem discussed above, to maximize flexibility in post-
mortem planning the dispositive instrument probably should explicitly remove
any such implied duty.
c. No Warms Adjustment for Administration Expenses Used to Offset Income
in Respect of a Decedent ("IRD"). A 1980 New York case, In re Will of
Backus,87 discussed whether a Warms adjustment is appropriate for administra-
tion expenses deducted on an income tax return to the extent that they offset
IRD.88 Because both estate tax and income tax on IRD are almost always paid
out of principal, deduction of these expenses probably will not harm principal
beneficiaries.89 Also, the Backus court observed that "the amounts involved in
IRD [usually] are relatively insignificant and in all likelihood [such] problems
go unrecognized except by corporate fiduciaries and experienced estate practi-
tioners."9
When large amounts of IRD are expected and the instrument or local law
provides a formula or discretionary power to make a Warms adjustment, it
probably is appropriate to follow Backus and to exclude IRD specifically when
calculating the adjustment.9 1 Backus indirectly supports any fiduciary who makes
less than the maximum Warms adjustment when, depending on the particular
circumstances involved, taking administration expenses or casualty losses on the
fiduciary income tax return produces offsetting economic benefits for the prin-
cipal beneficiaries.
B. Deduction of Principal Expenses on the Fiduciary Income Tax Return,
Resulting in Capital Gains Taxation of Principal Beneficiaries
1. Tax Law Sources of the Procedure and Adjustment
Section 643(a) defines distributable net income ("DNI") as including all
"taxable income of the estate or trust, computed with [certain] modifications." 92
87 106 Misc. 2d 463, 434 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980).
88 See Regs. § 1.691(a)-I(b)(definition of income in respect of a decedent); see also Regs.
§ 1.691(a)-2(a)(inclusion of income in respect of a decedent in gross income by recipients). Here-
inafter, income in respect of a decedent will be referred to as "IRD."89 See REv. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME AcT, supra note 9, § 13(c)(4); see also Moore, Conflicting
Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1902.
90 106 Misc. 2d at 465-66, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
91 Id. at 467, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 108. See Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1902.
92 Distributable net income as defined in I.R.C. section 643(a) will be referred to hereinafter as
"DNI." See Regs. § !.643(a)-0. Professor Boris I. Bittker characterized DNI best: "Because of
[its] allocative function, DNI has been called 'the pie to be cut for tax purposes'-though no
beneficiary will want a second helping." 3 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS 81.3.1 (1981), quoting M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES ix (1970) [hereinafter cited as M. FERGUSON]. See also
Regs. § 1.643(b)-l (definition of "income" used with respect to DNI). I.R.C. § 643(d)(regarding
interest and dividend withholding credits and DN1) was added by TEFRA, supra note 23, § 301(b),
H.R. REP. No. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H6239 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982).
Note that income excluded from gross income under section 103 is added back into DNI. Regs. §
1.643(a)-5. See generally Report of Committee on Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts, Income
Tax Opportunities and Pitfalls in Estate Distributions (Part 1), 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 854,
855-56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Estates and Trusts Income Tax Committee].
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Among these modifications is an exclusion for capital gains allocated to principal
and not actually distributed, required to be distributed or permanently set aside
for charity.93 Under section 641 (b), this "taxable income . . . shall be computed
[generally] in the same manner as for an individual." ' 94 Thus, deductions of
administration expenses payable from principal reduce DNI, even if paid from
principal, 95 and even in tax years when there is no income allocable to principal. 9 6
When capital gains or other income allocable to principal are recognized, these
deductions are still first used to reduce DNI (that is, income not allocable to
principal), thereby reducing the tax burden of income beneficiaries and increasing
that of principal beneficiaries. 97 Therefore, these deductions only reduce income
allocable to principal when they exceed DNI. 98 This use of principal expenditures
to reduce DNI does not involve a fiduciary election but instead involves an
automatic diversion of economic benefit to the income beneficiaries. For this
reason alone, some commentators have suggested that equitable adjustment to
compensate principal beneficiaries is neither necessary nor appropriate. 99
2. Statutory Responses
No statute tries to remedy this diversion of economic benefit to the income
beneficiaries. Indeed, conventional principal and income allocation rules require
it. 100
3. Judicial Responses
Courts in Pennsylvania, New York, Florida, and Massachusetts have faced
this problem, with conflicting results.
a. Pennsylvania. In an Orphans' Court case, In re Rice's Estate,10 1 the court
ordered an adjustment when the principal beneficiaries of a testamentary trust
were forced to pay capital gains tax even though, in the relevant taxable year,
the total of the capital gains deduction and deductible principal disbursements
exceeded the amount of the gain 102 and the income beneficiaries had paid less
93 Regs. § 1.643(a)-3.
94 I.R.C. § 641(b). See also Regs. § 1.643(a)-I.
95 See Regs.. § 1.643(d)-2 (example of how administration expenses reduce DNI).
96 See B. BrrrKER, supra note 92, 81.3.2; M. FERGUSON, supra note 92, at 395-97, 403-04;
Conway & Hale, supra note 57, at A-3 to A-4, A-6, A-15 to A-16; see also In re Rice's Estate, 8
Pa. D. & C.2d 379, 414-15 (Orphans' Ct. 1956).
97 Dobris I, supra note 1, at 118-20; Dobris II, supra note 2, at 321-22.
98 See Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1907.
9 E.g., Weigel & Trost, supra note 2, at 133-34. See In re Will of Backus, 106 Misc. 2d 463,
434 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980).
100 E.g., REV. UNIF. INCOME & PRINCIPAL Acr, supra note 9, §8 5, 13 (1962). These sections,
however, might be ignored pursuant to section 2(a)(3) of the Act. But see infra notes 105-08 and
accompanying text; infra note 117.
"01 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 379 (1956).
102 Id. at 416. In Rice, a testamentary trust realized $402,000 in capital gains; during the relevant
fiscal year, $202,000 in deductible attorneys' fees were charged to principal. Id. at 412. The then
current capital gains deduction was 50%. Id. Thus, if the remaining $201,000 in income could have
been offset by the deductible principal charges of $202,000, the principal account would have borne
no income tax burden in that year. Id.
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tax because DNI had been reduced by the amount of those principal expendi-
tures. 103
To support the adjustment, the Orphans' Court cited Warms as "precedent,
at least by close analogy."" The Rice court found that the operation of the tax
laws had been inequitable and ordered an adjustment, disregarding the absence
of any fiduciary choice as to whether principal expenditures would reduce DNI.
b. New York. The Surrogate's Court in In re Estate of Dick"°5 refused to order
an adjustment when a New York testamentary trustee, presumably trying to
follow Warms by analogy, charged the income account in the manner approved
in Rice.'°6 The New York Surrogate's Court agreed with the Pennsylvania Or-
phans' Court that the "inequities created by the tax statute, as between income
and principal interests in a trust, are apparent" and agreed with the fiduciary
that Rice supported his position.' 07 Surrogate Cox did not agree that Warms
justified the adjustment:
[The Warms decision] involved the exercise by an estate fiduciary of a statutory
option .... In the case at bar the trustee was not granted an option by the...
statute. That statute permitted only one method of computing the tax and this
court [does not have] the authority to alter the impact of the tax statute. 108
c. Florida. The court in In re Kent's Estate,' 9 citing Dick as authority, refused
to order an adjustment because the fiduciary had no choice. "0
d. Massachusetts. In New England Merchants National Bank v. Converse,"'
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused an adjustment under similar
facts, but for somewhat different reasons from those given by the New York
and Florida courts. The court held that the adjustment was not "practical."" 2
It cited the absence of significant uniform practice among Massachusetts fi-
103 Judge Taxis held as follows:
Whether by accident or design, the result is that, even when there are capital gains, the
trust [principal] loses the benefit of the deduction for expenses charged to principal and
the benefit of that deduction is given to income by statutory fiat ...
The basic design seems to have been to prevent expenses charged to principal from going
to waste. This portion of the change would have made sense, but why a principal expense
should be given to income as an income tax deduction, when the trust [principal] could
have used it, seems at least odd if not plainly inequitable.
Id. at 412-13.
" Id. at 414. Indeed, Judge Taxis used a Warms formula: "In such a situation, I take the view
that income should reimburse principal for the amount of tax which the trust [principal] was obliged
to pay .... " id. at 413.
"1o 29 Misc. 2d at 648, 218 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1961).
106 Id. at 650, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
107 Id. at 649, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
108 Id. at 650, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 184-85 (emphasis added). Surrogate Cox discussed at length the
analogous situation posed by estate tax apportionment statutes and reviewed New York precedent
barring its judges from varying from those statutory requirements. Id. at 650, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
1' 23 Fla. Supp. 133, 136 (Palm Beach County Ct. 1964).
110 Id.
"1 373 Mass. 639, 369 N.E.2d 982 (1977).
112 Id. at 640-41, 369 N.E.2d at 983.
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duciaries to make the adjustment. "13 The court looked to the potentially numerous
trusts and estates for which no adjustments had yet been made and for which
accounts might have to be reopened and "catch up" adjustments made, reducing
current income distributions. " 4 It wondered whether such adjustments would be
reasonable for small estates and trusts." 15 Finally, the court supposed that when
"large sums" were governed by dispositive instruments "drawn after 1954,"
there "no doubt commonly" had been included "provision for the problem here
presented."' 16
Thus, Rice supports adjustment, regardless of whether any election is involved,
because the federal tax law is sometimes unfair to principal beneficiaries; Dick
and Kent oppose adjustment because no election is involved and the fiduciary's
duties to be impartial and not to self-deal are irrelevant; 117 and Converse opposes
the adjustment because, this long after 1954, it simply is not practical.
4. Drafting Solutions
Because substantial changes to the DNI system are unlikely," 8 draftsmen
should consider providing for reimbursement to principal from income. The
difficult question is what system to use. 119 One reasonable method would be to
13 Id. at 643, 369 N.E.2d at 984.
"4 Id. The court also was concerned that, if its holdings were not applied retroactively, the
diversity of principal and income allocation rules would complicate settlement of accounts. Id. at
643-44, 369 N.E.2d at 984.
15 Id. at 644, 369 N.E.2d at 985.
116 Id.
17 Professor Dobris has concluded:
The Dick opinion is wrong; principal should be reimbursed for the lost use of the deduction.
Requiring an adjustment [also] is the proper course of action . . . when the allocation of
benefits and burdens of mandatory action is unjust under standard allocation rules ...
[One] approach might be to regard Dick as a case that confirms the general proposition
that no adjustment will be decreed when the fiduciary has no discretion, because it is the
presence of discretion that requires impartiality and leads to the adjustment. This . . .
assumes that a discretionary power is a prerequisite to an adjustment. [This assumption]
may be invalid. . . . If discretion is not required, as seems to be the case, Dick is simply
wrong.
Dobris 1, supra note 1, at 141-42. See also Dobris I1, supra note 2, at 321-23. It seems a misuse
of a court's equity powers to adjust for fiduciary actions when no other economic outcome is possible
given the federal tax laws and the authorizing dispositive instrument. For example, Weigel & Trost
state:
To require compensating adjustment in the context of non-elective tax provisions must be
considered an administrative Pandora's Box, however appealing as a matter of equity ...
While some courts have recognized the implications of such requirements, not all have
shown an awareness that the theory of fiduciary fairness which underlies the decisions in
Warms and Bixby is inapplicable in most instances of non-elective tax provisions.
Weigel & Trost, supra note 2, at 134.
"8 But see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr, SUBCHAPTER J (Tent. Draft
No. 9 1982).
119 National practice provides no answers. See ACPC chart, infra at Appendix, questions 2.a.
and 2.b. According to the chart, no jurisdiction's law directly requires the adjustment, and only in
Nevada is it common practice to make it. But see Louisiana practice, infra at Appendix n.37 (such
principal charges should not be made against income without approval of the income beneficiary).
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reimburse principal in an amount equal to income tax charged to principal times
a fraction, the denominator of which is the total taxable income for that year
and the numerator of which is net income attributable to principal (i.e., capital
gains, IRD, and other such income minus deductions taken on the fiduciary
income tax return that were paid from principal). Given the problems with
exculpating fiduciaries, 20 a discretionary power to adjust probably should not
be used. But except when large amounts of capital gain and substantial inequities
are involved, this adjustment probably should be prohibited expressly in the
instrument. Such a prohibition may not be necessary in New York and Florida,
in light of their case law.' 2' Because no fiduciary discretion is involved, there
should be no problem in designating a beneficiary as fiduciary.
C. Trapping Distributions Resulting in Principal Beneficiaries Bearing
Income Tax Burdens
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Another apparently unfair allocation of income tax liability arises in connection
with so-called "trapping distributions." '22 These are distributions from the prin-
cipal of an estate or distributor trust to a distributee trust, made to split taxable
income between the two entities. 23 This can only occur when a distribution
carries out DNI to the distributee trust (e.g., when an executor funds a residuary
trust in two or more taxable years) and the distributee trust does not distribute
all of its DNI to its beneficiaries during its taxable year. 124 Complete or partial
distribution of a specific bequest under section 663(a)(1) does not carry out DNI
and therefore cannot be used to make a trapping distribution.125 Under conven-
120 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
122 See generally Cohan & Frimmer, Trapping Distributions: The Trap That Pays, 112 TR. &
EST. 766 (1973); Comfeld, supra note 11, 1401, 1401.1 and 1401.2; Estates and Trusts Income
Tax Committee, supra note 92, at 868-71; J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.34.
123 "These distributions are called 'trapping distributions' because the estate's DN1 carried out
by its distribution is 'trapped' as principal in the trust. With proper timing the use of trapping
distributions . . . permits considerable deferral of tax." Estates and Trusts Income Tax Committee,
supra note 92, at 868.
124 The basic procedure involved here is the inclusion of distributed amounts in distributees' gross
income. Regarding such inclusion for beneficiaries of "simple" trusts, which are required to dis-
tribute current income and only distribute current income in the relevant taxable year, see section
652 and Regulations section 1.652(a)-I. For inclusion of distributions to beneficiaries of estates and
of complex trusts, which may or may not accumulate income, but which do distribute principal in
the relevant taxable year, see section 662 and Regulations sections 1.662(a)-I, 1.662(a)-2, and
1.662(a)-3.
125 Section 663(a)(I)provides:
Any amount which . . . is properly paid or credited as a gift or bequest of a specific sum
of money or of specific property and which is paid or credited all at once or in not more
than 3 installments [shall not be included as an amount falling within the scope of section
661(a) or 662(a)].
The second sentence of section 663(a)(1) states that a distribution of a specific amount of income
from a "simple" trust (i.e., one to which section 651(a) applies) can carry out DNI and be used
to make a trapping distribution. Regulations section 1.663(a)-I(b)(1) provides:
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tional principal and income allocation rules, if the estate or distributor trust
distributes principal, it remains principal in the distributee trust.' 2 6 The estate
or distributor trust, however, still receives a distribution deduction under section
651 or section 661 equal to the amount of DNI carried out to the distributee
trust.127 Assuming that the distributee trust does not make distributions during
its taxable year from other sources in excess of its DNI, it must pay income tax
on a portion of the estate's or distributor trust's DNI, presumably from its newly
augmented principal account.' 28 Thus, (a) two entities share the income tax
liability on the estate's or distributor trust's DNI, (b) the personal representative
or distributing trustee can fund the distributee trust with a smaller economic
value than if the estate or distributor trust had been required to bear the income
tax liability on all of its own DNI, and (c) the principal of the distributee trust
may be substantially less after the tax payment than the principal beneficiaries
may otherwise have expected. 12 9
The fiduciary minimizing income taxation of an estate or distributor trust often
funds distributee trusts with a series of principal distributions, in several taxable
years, to equalize the highest marginal tax rates paid by the estate or distributor
trust and the distributee trust or trusts each year. In addition, if trust accounting
income also is distributed to the distributee trust, its trustee can make income
distributions carrying out DNI to its beneficiaries and thereby equalize highest
marginal tax rates among the estate or distributor trust, the distributee trust and
In order to qualify as a gift or bequest of a specific sum of money or of specific property
under section 663(a), the amount of money or the identity of the specific property must
be ascertainable under the terms of a testator's will as of the date of his death, or under
the terms of an inter vivos trust instrument as of the date of the inception of the trust ...
[A] bequest to the decedent's spouse of money or property, to be selected by the decedent's
executor, equal in value to a fraction of the decedent's "adjusted gross estate" is neither
a bequest of a specific sum of money or of specific property.
126 E.g., REV. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME Ac-r, supra note 9, §§ 5(a), 13(c).
27 See sections 651, 661, and the regulations thereunder.
128 Note, however, that if beneficiaries receive distributions of such principal in subsequent taxable
years, they might be liable to an additional amount of income tax under the "throwback" rules.
See generally Comfeld, supra note 11, 1400.6; I.R.C. §§ 665-668 and the regulations thereunder.
The amount of such additional taxation approximates the difference between the amount that would
have been paid by the beneficiary had he received the accumulation distribution in the year in which
it was originally received by the trust, minus any income tax already paid by the trust attributable
to the accumulation distribution. See generally Regs. § 1.665(a)-OA. This approximation involves
a complex averaging system. See I.R.C. § 667(b); J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 10.2. This "throwback"
tax only is imposed on accumulation distributions as defined in Regulations section 1.665(b)-lA.
Such distributions do not include those of "income accumulated before the birth of [a] beneficiary
or before [a] beneficiary attains the age of 21.' I.R.C. § 665(b). Distributions to simple trusts from
an estate or another trust that may be characterized as "outside income" (within the meaning of
Regulations section § 1.665(e)-IA(b)) result in throwback taxation; "outside income" includes IRD,
unrealized accounts receivable assigned to the simple trust and "distributions from another trust that
include distributable net income or undistributed net income of such other trust" but excludes all
other distributions if they are from an estate. Regs. § 1.665(e)-IA(b)(3).
129 Professor Dobris gives a good example of how such a distribution not only traps estate or
distributor trust income in the distributee trust, but also traps the principal beneficiaries of the latter
trust into paying additional income tax. See Dobris I, supra note I, at 128.
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the distributee trust beneficiaries. 130 Such marginal tax rate equalization is the
same basic strategy involved in planning where to take administration expense
and casualty loss deductions. The unfairness to distributee trust principal ben-
eficiaries also is similar, for another group of beneficiaries pays less income tax
while they pay more. Even though income tax payment by the distributee trust
is often deferred, because its taxable year ends before that of the estate or
distributor trust and distribution is made after the distributee trust's year ends,
its principal beneficiaries eventually may bear a disproportionately large share
of the income tax burden.
2. Statutory Responses
No statutes discussing the election were found.
3. Judicial Responses
Although only one significant case has been decided in this area, it probably
has caused adjustments for principal beneficiaries in many situations. In In re
Holloway's Estate,"' the New York Surrogate's Court recognized that trapping
distributions long have been an important tax minimization technique of the
"sophisticated fiduciary," but concluded that they nonetheless cause unfair al-
location of income tax liability.' 32 Surrogate Bennett held that the Dick decision
was inapposite because it had involved no true fiduciary election,133 but held
that the decision partially to fund the trust with principal could be an election
breaching the fiduciary duties to be impartial and not to self-deal:
[A] realistic view of this problem requires the determination based upon the
purely equitable principle that the burden of income taxes should be charged to
the account into which the tax item goes .... Here the distribution resulting in
taxes for which an adjustment is sought was in fact corpus or principal. Such
distribution was only 'deemed' income by the taxing authorities. The tax in fact
is attributable to receipt by the estate of income for accounting purposes. While
the Code provisions may fly in the face of reality, there is no reason for a court
concerned with the proper administration of estates to follow suit. 134
Thus, Surrogate Bennett took an approach similar to that taken by the Penn-
sylvania court in Rice. 135 The language of Holloway and Rice supports the broader
proposition that, even when nonelective tax procedures alter beneficial interests,
a state court can override statutory principal and income allocation rules and
order an adjustment.
130 See Comfeld, supra note 11, 1400.4, 1401.1, 1401.2; Estates and Trusts Income Tax
Committee, supra note 92, at 865-68.
1 68 Misc. 2d 361, 327 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
132 Id. at 362, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 866. In this regard, the court noted that the Code can be "a
serious tax trap for the unwary." Id.
133 Id. at 364, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 867. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
134 Id. at 365, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
135 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
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4. Drafting Solutions
The Holloway adjustment has been referred to as so obviously equitable that
"it is a common practice" for trustees to make it. 136 The ACPC study, however,
shows no such "common practice.' ' 137 Although some commentators advocate
routinely drafting to require the adjustment, 13 a more moderate approach is
indicated:
a. Formula Direction. It usually is difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct
the income tax situation of the estate or distributor trust to the extent necessary
to calculate the exact amount of tax eventually borne by the principal beneficiaries
of the distributee trust (particularly with residuary distributions). Often untaxed
DNI is added to the estate or distributor trust's principal account and later
distributed to the distributee trust, compensating the latter trust's principal be-
neficiaries at least in part for earlier principal reductions. Further, as noted above,
their income tax might not become due and payable for many months (if the
distributee trust has a different taxable year).' 39
Thus, when the draftsman wishes to permit the fiduciary to adjust accounts,
he should provide a particular formula for the fiduciary, so that not all of these
factors need be considered. Additionally, there are at least two reasonable meth-
ods of reimbursement: (1) the income account of the estate or distributor trust
could immediately reimburse the distributee trust principal account, or (2) the
distributee trust income account could reimburse the distributee trust principal
account over a period of several years.' 40 Either method will involve additional
inequities if the current income beneficiaries of the estate or distributor trust are
different from those of the distributee trust. 4 ' Such reimbursements may con-
stitute income to the principal beneficiaries or to the trustee, and such liability
probably should be taken into account when drafting the formula.
b. Discretionary Direction. Given the formula's lack of flexibility, a simple
136 E.g., Comfeld, supra note 11, 1405; see also Conway & Hale, supra note 57, at A-19.
131 See ACPC chart, infra at Appendix, questions 3.a and 3.b. Only in New York is the adjustment
required. In six other states (Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon and Rhode Island)
it is common practice to make the adjustment.
138 E.g., Conway & Hale, supra note 57, at A-19; see also Comfeld, supra note 11, 1405.
139 See infra notes 215-21 and accompanying text (discussion of fiduciary selection of a taxable
year); I.R.C. §§ 441(b), 443(a)(2); Estates and Trusts Income Tax Committee, supra note 92, at
856-58. The committee states: "With proper timing the use of trapping distributions permits ...
considerable deferral of tax." Id. at 868.
140 See Conway & Hale, supra note 57, at A-19; see also Cohan & Frimmer, supra note 122, at
768-69; Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1920.
141 Comfeld states:
[In many, if not most, cases where the tax is shifted in order to achieve overall tax savings,
the income and remainder beneficiaries will be friendly and have common interests....
[ln [such] cases ...an equitable adjustment [can] have favorable estate planning con-
sequences. The adjustment will serve to deplete the assets of the income beneficiary who
in most cases will be in a generation older than the remainderman. Thus, the remainderman
will ultimately receive the amount of the adjustment without imposition of another estate
tax.
Cornfeld, supra note 11, 1405.
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discretionary power to make adjustments sometimes is more sensible. 14 2 New
York case law supports the basic power of the fiduciary to "apportion between
capital and income [such] money paid for . . . taxes." 143 There is no precedent
from New York or elsewhere, however, considering a challenge to any "actual
method of apportionment or the mathematics of the apportionment."'" Thus,
the fiduciary still may have to argue in support of the reasonableness of a
particular adjustment, making broad exculpation a necessity.145 Finally, when-
ever a beneficiary affected by such a discretionary adjustment serves as fiduciary,
the issue of self-dealing arises, possibly forcing the fiduciary to elect automat-
ically against his own best interests. 146
c. Prohibition of Adjustment. Due to the complexity of such planning, 147 the
transferor reasonably may decide to bar all such adjustments, notwithstanding
the resulting inequity. Transferors who want to favor beneficiaries other than
the principal beneficiaries of the distributee trust should explicitly authorize the
fiduciary to sacrifice their interests to minimize income taxes and thereby benefit
other beneficiaries. Other transferors will bar adjustment because administration
of a complicated formula is costly for all beneficiaries, particularly principal
beneficiaries ordinarily bearing such administration expenses.
142 See Barton, supra note 11, 902. i (general approaches to drafting such clauses).
143 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussion of New York case In re Estate of
LeCompte).
'1 In re Estate of LeCompte, 52 Misc. 2d 549, 552, 276 N.Y.S.2d 208, 212 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County 1966).
145 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (grants of absolute discretion tend to be read narrowly).
146 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (conflict of interest for beneficiary who is also
fiduciary).
147 On planning complexity, Cornfeld states:
The making of equitable adjustments may have further tax consequences by creating a
further trapping of income. Unfortunately (or fortunately depending on one's point of
view), the tax consequences of such a trapping resulting from an equitable adjustment are
not entirely clear. For example, assume a residuary trust otherwise qualifying as a simple
trust, receives a trapping distribution in 1980, resulting in an income tax of $5,000 payable
April 15, 1981. If the trustee withholds $5,000 of 1981 income adding same to corpus as
an equitable adjustment, the following possible arguments could be made: First, it could
be argued that the withholding constituted a constructive distribution to the income ben-
eficiary as a payment of a liability of such income beneficiary to the corpus of the trust.
Second, it could be argued that the amount of the adjustment constituted income which
was not "required to be distributed currently" under the terms of the governing instrument
and local law for purposes of I.R.C. section 651 or section 652 . . . .Under this theory,
the trust would become a complex trust for the year 1981 (and each subsequent year in
which an equitable adjustment would be required). Finally, it could be argued that the
requirement of the equitable adjustment affects the determination of what constitutes "in-
come" under local law and the governing instrument. Under this theory, the trust would
remain a simple trust with permanent tax saving with respect to the income trapped by
the adjustment.
Cornfeld, supra note 11, 1405. Each approach produces a dramatically different postmortem
income tax planning result. The least expensive way to deal with such complexity might be to
prevent it from arising in the first place. See also supra note 57.
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D. Election to Deduct Depreciation on the Fiduciary Income Tax Return,
Reducing Income Beneficiaries' and Increasing Principal Beneficiaries'
Income Tax Burdens
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
As noted above, in the absence of an explicit direction to the contrary in the
dispositive instrument, income beneficiaries of an estate or trust are liable for
any income tax on DNI received by them. 148 The total amount of DNI available
for distribution in any tax year is in turn determined under sections 641(b) and
643(a), taking into account deductions of the estate or trust. 14 9 In general, an
estate or trust may deduct otherwise allowable depreciation as long as benefi-
ciaries do not deduct it. 150 Under section 167(h), the personal representative or
trustee and the beneficiaries must allocate the depreciation deduction "on the
basis of the income ...allocable to each," but this allocation may be varied
for trustees and trust beneficiaries "in accordance with the pertinent provisions
of the instrument creating the trust.' 15 1 Thus, assuming that the income bene-
ficiaries receive all income and that conventional principal and income allocation
rules apply, section 167(h) could result in depreciation reducing only the income
beneficiaries' income tax liability, leaving the principal beneficiaries to pay
income tax on later transactions involving depreciated property in which gain is
recognized or depreciation is recaptured. 152 This problem can be referred to as
a "nonelective procedure" because the section 167(h) allocation is as automatic
as, for example, DNI reduction by deductible principal expenses. 5 3 To the extent
that the method of depreciation can be selected and the fiduciary can depart from
customary principal and income allocation rules, however, this "procedure" is
more similar to the sort of "election" discussed in the immediately preceding
section. 114
2. Statutory Responses
No statutes directly address this potentially unfair allocation of economic
benefit to income beneficiaries. Note, however, the discussion below of discre-
tionary reallocation of principal and income when "reasonable and equitable"
148 See generally supra note 124.
149 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (definition of DNI).
15o I.R.C. § 642(e); see also Regs. § 1.642(e)-i.
151 I.R.C. § 167(h). Regulations section 1.167(h)-l(b) provides:
Trusts. . . . [T]he allowable deduction is to be apportioned between the income benefi-
ciaries and the trustee on the basis of the trust income allocable to each, unless the governing
instrument (or local law) requires or permits the trustee to maintain a reserve for depre-
ciation in any amount. In the latter case, the deduction is first allocated to the trustee to
the extent that income is set aside for a depreciation reserve ....
(Emphasis added.)
152 Id.; I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250; Conway and Hale, supra note 57, at A-12.
1 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
15' See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
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under, for instance, section 2 of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income
Act. 155
3. Judicial Responses
Research has disclosed only one court that has addressed this issue directly,
the New York Surrogate's Court, in In re Will of Pross. 5 6 In that case, a
testamentary trustee had taken large depreciation deductions for a "tax shelter"
limited partnership interest during a five-year period, causing the income ben-
eficiary to have no income tax liability for those years. 157 When the limited
partnership defaulted on certain debts and its secured creditors foreclosed, the
trustee recognized over $21,000 of capital gain (because the partnership interest's
basis had been reduced by this amount in the prior five years).' 58 Conventional
principal and income allocation rules required the principal to pay the capital
gains tax, even though it had received no benefit from the depreciation.' 5 9
Surrogate Brewster, citing In re Holloway's Estate, ' refused to allow this result:
If the trustees set aside the amount deducted for depreciation to preserve principal
in fulfillment of their duty, the reserve would be wholly applicable to principal
and the source of the capital gain. However, in this case, there was no reserve.
The capital gain is nothing more than a paper entry which has come about by
reason of the depreciation deduction having reduced the base [sic] of the property
below the amount realized upon the foreclosure. There was no addition to,
appreciation of or replacement for the trust principal. . . .To the extent that the
income beneficiary received the benefits of the deduction for depreciation without
any concomitant benefit to trust principal, equity requires that the charge for the
capital gains tax be placed on the person receiving the capital gain.' 61
Surrogate Brewster concluded that, under section 2(a)(3) of New York's ver-
sion of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, the fiduciary had been
free to do whatever would have been "reasonable and equitable . . . in view of
the manner in which men of ordinary prudence, discretion and judgment would
act in the management of their own affairs." 162 While Pross has been referred
to as authority for equitable adjustment even when the fiduciary has no discre-
tion,1 63 it did involve an election not to establish a depreciation reserve and
probably should therefore be considered distinct from the Rice-Dick-Converse
line of cases. 1
155 REv. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT, supra note 9, § 2.
1'6 90 Misc. 2d 895, 396 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Sur. Ct. 1977).
157 Id. at 896-98, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 309-10.
158 Id. at 897, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 310. This amount of capital gain was recognized because the
partnership interest's basis had been reduced by distributions in the prior five years. The recognition
effect could as readily have been produced by sale of such a depreciated asset by the trustee.
159 Id. at 897-98, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 310-11.
160 68 Misc. 2d 361, 327 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1965); see supra text accom-
panying notes 131-35.
161 90 Misc. 2d at 898, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
162 Id. at 897-98 (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2. l(a)(I)(McKinney 1965)).
163 Dobris I, supra note 1, at 142 n.224.
'64 See supra notes 101-08, 111-16 (no deduction required due to statute or prevailing practice).
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4. Drafting Solutions
Estate planners and draftsmen have substantially more flexibility in dealing
with this problem than do advisors of fiduciaries. Moreover, they have substan-
tially more flexibility in drafting trust provisions than in drafting estate admin-
istration provisions. 65 Section 167(h) allows "pertinent provisions of the instrument
creating [that] trust" to apportion "the allowable deduction . . . between the
income beneficiaries and the trustee." 16' These provisions in turn can direct the
trustee to create a depreciation reserve, and the deduction is allocated to the
trustee to the extent that income is either set aside for the reserve or allocated
to the trustee (i.e., accumulated).1 67 The depreciation deduction is similarly
allocated if the trustee is merely permitted by the instrument to establish such a
reserve. 168 If the trustee may establish a reserve under local law and does so,
the deduction is again allocated. 169 Strangely enough, executors and adminis-
trators may not allocate the deduction even if the will or local law authorizes
them to establish reserves; to the contrary, section 167(h) requires that the
deduction allocation be based solely on the income allocation.'
70
Guidelines for planners or draftsmen who anticipate substantial amounts of
depreciation and resulting income tax liability for principal beneficiaries are the
following:
a. Arrange for depreciable property to be held in trust (or if devised, to be
used to fund a testamentary trust as soon as possible after the decedent's death);
b. Direct or permit the trustee to establish a reserve; if discretion is given,
exculpate the trustee.
When the focus of drafting is on an estate holding depreciable assets, the drafts-
man cannot merely direct or permit establishment of a reserve. ' 7' Reallocation
of the economic benefit of the depreciation deduction for estate beneficiaries
65 The inflexible DNI system is the root cause of the Pross inequities, and the only complete
solution would be a reform of that system directly linking the depreciation deduction to income
allocable to principal for income tax purposes. Because such a reform is unlikely, a more limited
solution must be sought. But see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUB-
CHAPTER J (Tent. Draft No. 9 1982). For a general discussion of the DNI system, see supra note
92.
6 I.R.C. § 167(h). Although I.R.C. section 167(h) refers to apportionment of the depreciation
deduction between income beneficiaries and the trustee, this effectively means apportionment between
those beneficiaries and the principal beneficiaries. Under customary principal and income allocation
rules, principal beneficiaries would pay capital gains taxes involving principal assets, and the trustee
presumably would make those tax payments on their behalf. See generally REV. UNIF. PRINCIPAL
& INCOME ACT, supra note 9, § 13(c)(4).
167 See supra note 15 1. Regulations section 1. 167(h)- I (b)(2) states:
If under the trust instrument or local law the income of a trust is to be distributed to a
named beneficiary, but the trustee is directed to maintain a reserve for depreciation, ...
the deduction is allowed to the trustee. . . . The same result would follow if the trustee
sets aside income for a depreciation reserve pursuant to discretionary authority to do so
in the governing instrument.
166 Regs. § 1.167(h)-l(b)(2).
169 id.
170 I.R.C. § 167(h); Regs. § 167(h)-l(c).
171 Id.
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requires an adjustment similar to that suggested for the Rice-Dick-Converse
situation. 172 Here the draftsman should use a formula whenever possible, perhaps
simply transferring from income to principal whatever capital gains tax is borne
by principal beneficiaries, as required in Rice. 173 Establishment of depreciation
reserves probably should be barred, because section 167(h) allows no deduction
allocation on that basis.
When substantial principal beneficiary income tax burdens are not expected,
establishment of depreciation reserves by trustees may be unwise, particularly
when income beneficiaries have high marginal income tax brackets and need
substantial amounts of income. Even when substantial economic harm to prin-
cipal beneficiaries results, some transferors will prefer to prohibit this adjustment
to favor income beneficiaries. In either case, the draftsman should state the
transferor's intent, should prohibit the adjustment expressly and in many in-
stances should also prohibit establishment of depreciation reserves, particularly
when local law requires or permits them.
E. Disproportionate Distributions of Income and Principal to Satisfy
Pecuniary or Residuary Gifts in Kind, Causing Disproportionate Sharing
of Income Tax Burdens by Beneficiaries
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Inequities generated by non-pro rata distributions of income and principal arise
in several ways:
a. When particular distributions of income are not required, disproportionate
distributions of income or of principal to satisfy pecuniary or residuary gifts (but
not distributions under specific dispositions) can carry out DNI and cause in-
equitable sharing of income tax liability by beneficiaries. '7 4
b. The accumulation of income by a trust and its distribution in later taxable
years can cause beneficiaries to be taxed under the so-called "throwback" rules
(generally based on what their individual income tax liabilities would have been
had they received the distribution in the year of accumulation, minus any tax
already paid by the trust). 175
c. Finally, if assets are distributed by a fiduciary in kind to satisfy a pecuniary
disposition (whether or not under a formula), the income tax bases of the assets
are adjusted to fair market value at the time of distribution. 17 6 If such assets are
172 See supra text accompanying notes 119-31.
' 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 379 (1956); see supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
174 See supra notes 92-98, 124-28 and accompanying text (background discussion of the DNI
system); see also Asofsky, Funding Bequests, POST MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 255-65 (P. Asofsky
ed. 1981); Dobris II, supra note 2, at 325-39. See generally J. PRICE, supra note 2, §§ 12.30-
12.33.
175 See supra note 128. Again, these rules generally do not apply to accumulation of income by
estates or to distributions to beneficiaries who were less than 21 years of age when the trust earned
the income. I.R.C. § 665(b); Regs. § 1.665(e)-IA(b). See generally B. BIrKER, supra note 92,
81.5; H. DUBROFF & D. KAHN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFrS AND TRUSTS, 37.1 (3d
ed. 1980), 37.5 (advantages of accumulation distributions).
176 E.g., Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1940); Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1
C.B. 286.
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distributed under a specific disposition or from the residue, however, their income
tax bases in the hands of distributees equal their values in the federal estate tax
return. 77 If that value is below the date of distribution value, the distributee of
a residuary distribution thus may receive not only an amount of DNI based on
the distribution value but also a relatively low income tax basis; if the residuary
distribution is from a trust rather than from an estate, the distributee may also
have to pay additional throwback income tax. 178
The interaction of these income tax effects raises the following possibilities
of economic harm to distributees:
a. Income Accumulation. Ideally, a trust will accumulate income only for
beneficiaries who later will have no throwback tax problem (such as those under
the age of twenty-one years when income is accumulated) or for those wishing
to defer payment of the throwback tax until the later taxable year when the
accumulated income is finally distributed. 179 Beneficiaries who currently have
relatively little other income or who will not be able to bear easily the throwback
tax in a later year might be harmed by such accumulations and later distribu-
tions. ' 80 Generally, any beneficiary whose marginal income tax bracket in the
current tax year is lower than that of the trust (or of the estate, in some cases),
and to whom trust income subsequently is distributed (even without throwback
taxation), can be harmed by accumulation and later distribution.
b. Non-Pro Rata Income Distribution Problems. A fiduciary who has the
discretion to sprinkle income among several beneficiaries whose marginal income
tax brackets change from year to year can penalize beneficiaries having relatively
high marginal income tax brackets by making distributions during such tax years.
Further, such a fiduciary can penalize beneficiaries having relatively low brackets
by not making distributions.18'
c. Non-Pro Rata Principal Distribution Problems: Satisfying Pecuniary and
Residuary Gifts in Kind. These problems are similar to those concerning trapping
distributions'8 2 because disproportionate distributions of principal to satisfy re-
siduary or formula pecuniary gifts can carry out unequal amounts of DNI and
effectively reduce the economic value of the distributions. 83 If the amount of
a formula pecuniary gift can be objectively ascertained as of the moment of
death or as of the effective date of a trust, the beneficiary does not receive a
share of DNI and the distribution value is unaffected.' 84 If a fiduciary makes
such specific distributions in the same taxable year in which he makes nonspecific
"I I.R.C. § 1014; Regs. §§ 1.1014-1, -3. See also H. DUBROFF & D. KAHN, supra note 175,
35.4; Barton, supra note 11, 903.1. See generally Regs. §§ 1.1014-2 to -9.
171 See supra notes 128 and 175.
179 See generally Cornfeld, supra note 11, 1400.6 (throwback rules not applicable to distributions
by estates or to accumulations of income before the 21st birthday of the distributee).
I8o See Estates and Trusts Income Tax Committee, supra note 92, at 865-68, 876-77.
181 See Dobris II, supra note 2, at 335-39.
182 See generally supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
83 See Asofsky, supra note 174, at 259-64; see also Estates and Trusts Income Tax Committee,
supra note 92, at 876-77; J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.32.
1' Regs. § 1.663(a)-l(a), -(b). See generally supra note 125.
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distributions (which do carry out DNI), the distribution of economic value can
be even further skewed.185 Finally, if date of distribution values are used to
make in kind distributions, an estate or trust may recognize gain or loss on
distribution, perhaps imposing a capital gains tax on the principal beneficiaries
and giving them an equitable adjustment claim.186 All of these problems again
raise the basic question of whether a fiduciary should consider individual ben-
eficiary marginal income tax rates before deciding to make distributions.
d. Suitability of Income Tax Basis for Distributees. If distributed assets receive
a new, higher income tax basis equal to fair market value on the date of distri-
bution, this benefits high bracket income tax beneficiaries intending to sell or
otherwise exchange the asset in the near future, but perhaps not other benefi-
ciaries.' 87 If assets are distributed to satisfy a pecuniary formula gift at their
estate tax value, the assets retain that value as their income tax basis in the hands
of the distributee. 88 If such an asset has appreciated since its estate tax valuation,
its distribution would be relatively less desirable for a high bracket income tax
distributee, and more desirable for a low bracket income tax distributee, planning
to sell the asset in the relatively near future.
8 9
Thus, equitable adjustment claims can arise from non-pro rata distributions
of income or principal, depending on different marginal income tax rates among
beneficiaries, the fiduciary's knowledge of how such rates will change over
several taxable years and the possibility that appreciated assets will be sold by
beneficiaries in the current or a future taxable year.
2. Statutory Responses
No statute directly addresses these issues. Many states have departed from
the common law rule that personal representatives .of an estate must satisfy
pecuniary or residuary gifts in cash unless the beneficiaries consent to another
mode of distribution. 19° New York and several other states now specifically
permit in kind satisfaction of legacies and other gifts without court order; usually,
beneficiaries may still object to noncash, non-pro rata distributions.' 9' Section
185 For instance, assume that there are nine specific amount legatees (which amount exceeds
$10,000) and one residuary legatee and that the value of all legacies is equal. Assume further that
the estate earns only $10,000 DNI during its fiscal year and that the personal representative distributes
to each legatee in kind an asset then worth $10,000. The first nine legatees would pay no income
tax at all and the last would pay income tax on a full $10,000. See also I.R.C. § 663(b)(allowing
fiduciary of a complex trust to elect to treat amounts distributed within 65 days of the end of its
taxable year as having been distributed in the prior year); Regs. §§ 1.663(b)-1, -2.
186 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-314, 1964-2 C.B. 167; Rev. Rul. 69-486, 1969-2 C.B. 159; see also
Asofsky, supra note 174, at 263-64.
187 See generally Estates and Trusts Income Tax Committee, supra note 92, at 861; Moore,
Conflicting Interests 1978, supra note 2, 603.2-603.3.
188 Regs. § 1.1014-1.
189 See Moore, Conflicting Interests 1978, supra note 2, 603.2-603.3.
190 See Villard v. Villard, 219 N.Y. 482, 500, 114 N.E. 789, 793 (1916); see also Asofsky,
supra note 174, at 271.
191 N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1. l(b)(McKinney Supp. 1982-83):
In the absence of. . . provisions in the . . . order. . . appointing a fiduciary, . . . or in
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3-906 of the Uniform Probate Code, 92 enacted in some form by over a dozen
states, further states that a "residuary estate shall be distributed in kind [only]
if . . . it is practicable to distribute undivided interests." 93 A few states have
specifically eliminated any fiduciary responsibility to consider the income tax
basis of assets distributed. 194 All of these statutory provisions require, implicitly
or explicitly, that such property be distributed in kind only at its fair market
value at the time of distribution. 95 None, however, address the question of
whether the beneficiaries' income tax status must be taken into account in making
such distributions.
3. Judicial Responses
Several cases have discussed related issues. For instance, in a 1965 Pennsyl-
vania case, In re Salesky's Estate,'9 6 the Orphans' Court held that a widow who
had taken against the will was entitled to an equitable adjustment because her
distribution had been the only one made during the estate's fiscal year and had
carried out almost all of the estate's DNI.' 97 The estate's income tax saving
totalled almost $15,000 and the widow, because of individual deductions, ac-
tually paid almost $10,000 in taxes.' 98 According to Judge Taxis, "equitable
principles demand that an adjustment should be made measured by the tax saving
to the estate or the tax detriment to the distributee, whichever is less."' 199 A
similar result occurred in a 1966 Florida case, In re Estate of Cooper,200 in
which the executor had explicitly agreed to compensate the widow "because of
the . . . instrument, every fiduciary is authorized:
(20) To distribute in kind any property at its fair market value at the date of distribution.
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1-804(2)(u)(Supp. 1982); Asofsky, supra note 174, at 272-73.
'92 UNIF. PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. 281 (1975).
193 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-906(a)(4), 8 U.L.A. 281, 471 (1975). According to the "Comment"
to this section:
[lit directs a personal representative to make distribution in kind whenever feasible and
to convert assets to cash only where there is a special reason for doing so. . . . It is
implicit . . . that each residuary beneficiary's basic right is to his proportionate share of
each asset constituting the residue.
,9 See Asofsky, supra note 174 at 273-74, citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-22-8 (1977). The North
Carolina statute provides as follows:
Unless otherwise restricted by the terms of the will or trust, an executor or trustee shall
have absolute discretion to make distributions in cash or in specific property, real or
personal, or an undivided interest therein or partly in cash or partly in such property, and
to do so without regard to the income tax basis for federal tax purposes of specific property
allocated to any beneficiary.
195 E.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1. l(b)(20)(McKinney Supp. 1982-83); Uniform
Short Form Clauses for Wills and Trusts Act § 3-101(m), 15 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 837, 850-
51 (1980)(proposed fiduciary power allows satisfaction of any payment, distribution or division with
any property at current fair market value as determined by the fiduciary without court approval).
191 15 Pa. Fiduc. 213, 215 (Orphans' Ct. 1965).
197 Id. at 215-16.
198 Id. at 216.
199 Id.
200 186 So. 2d 844, 845-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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the fact that she [was] required to pay Federal income taxes on" distributions
in satisfaction of her dower rights.20 ' Strangely, Cooper did not cite'Salesky,
and Cooper has been cited more often than Salesky as authority for adjustment
because of inequities caused by disproportionate DNI distributions. 20 2 In light
of the Cooper executor's explicit agreement, however, Salesky seems to be the
only case that squarely supports such an adjustment.
There appear to be no cases discussing whether a fiduciary must consider a
distributee's current or future income tax status and the income tax basis of
assets when planning distributions. Two courts, however, have addressed the
related issue of whether fiduciaries must consider beneficiary income tax planning
when making certain other trust income distributions. In a Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court case, Third National Bank & Trust Co. v. Campbell,203
the income tax basis of real estate investment trust interests held as trust assets
had been reduced over several years by nontaxable capital distributions (because
the real estate trusts had no taxable income during those years) .2° When the
trustee sold those interests at a value in excess of their income tax bases, a
capital gain resulted.205 Under the instrument, the nontaxable capital distributions
had augmented trust accounting income but the principal beneficiaries had borne
the capital gains tax burden. 2" Nevertheless, the court refused to order an
adjustment because to do so would have been the equivalent of ordering creation
of a reserve to protect the principal beneficiaries, which would have been "man-
ifestly impractical.' 207 Campbell in turn was quoted at length by the New York
Surrogate's Court in In re Estate of Simmons to support denial of an adjustment
in a similar situation involving stock dividends payable to income benefici-
aries. 2 0
8
4. Drafting Solutions
Thus, planners, draftsmen or fiduciary advisors have little precedent or local
practice to guide decisions about such adjustments.20 9 Generally speaking, such
201 Id. at 845.
202 See, e.g., Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1908; Dobris I, supra note 1,
at 135-36.
203 336 Mass. 352, 145 N.E.2d 703 (1957).
204 Id. at 353-54, 145 N.E.2d at 704.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 356-57, 145 N.E.2d at 706. Cf. Moore, Conflicting Interests 1978, supra note 2,
606.5.
208 30 Misc. 2d 1022, 1023-24, 220 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1961). See Pastan
v. Pastan, 378 Mass. 148, 154-55, 390 N.E.2d 253, 256-57 (1979). Cf. Commercial Trust Co. v.
Barnard, 27 N.J. 332, 340, 142 A.2d 865, 869 (1958).
209 See ACPC chart, infra at Appendix, questions 4.a., 4.b., 6.a. and 6.b. When principal
distributions carrying out DNI subject the distributee to income taxation (question 4), only one state,
Pennsylvania, requires adjustment and in only five (Colorado, Oklahoma, Oregon, Nevada, and
Rhode Island) is it common practice to adjust accounts. When disproportionate distributions send
high basis assets to one beneficiary and low basis assets to another (question 6), no jurisdiction
requires adjustment (but see the Arkansas and Missouri responses to question 6.b. and nn.7, 46,
ACPC chart, infra at Appendix) and in only one state, Nevada, is it a common practice to adjust.
In seven states, however, non-pro rata distributions do not appear to be made without authorization
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adjustments probably are not a cost effective way of protecting beneficiaries' in-
terests; i.e., they quickly become impossibly complex and unacceptably expen-
sive. 210 The accumulation issue probably can best be resolved by the grant of broad
discretion to accumulate or distribute income with absolutely no duty (or authority,
even) to make adjustments among beneficiaries. If the fiduciary is prohibited from
making such accumulation adjustments, exculpation should be unnecessary.
Regarding disproportionate distributions of income in any single taxable year,
Professor Dobris has suggested that whenever a distribution is made to the income
tax advantage of one beneficiary and disadvantage of another beneficiary, an ad-
justment in the amount of the disadvantage should be made if it does not exceed
the advantage to the first beneficiary. 211 This is nothing more or less than a Warms
(or Salesky) adjustment, of course, and should involve all of the difficulties of
adjustments in the accumulation area. The draftsman should specifically remove
any duty to make such adjustments because they would be too complex and ex-
pensive. This is best done either by granting broad discretion to make pro rata or
non-pro rata income distributions without consideration of distributees' income tax
status, or by limiting such discretion with ascertainable standards, such as support
or medical care.
As seen in the Salesky and Cooper cases, dramatic inequities can arise from
distributions in kind to satisfy pecuniary and residuary gifts and elective share rights.
Accordingly, the fiduciary should be granted broad discretion to make such distri-
butions, without regard to beneficiary income tax planning, but perhaps at the same
time should be granted authority to make adjustments in his reasonable discretion,
with broad exculpation. 212
With respect to the income tax basis of distributed assets, fiduciaries should be
given broad discretion to make distributions in kind, without regard to income tax
basis and with exculpation for any claim resulting from such distributions. 2 3
Finally, recall the self-dealing problems raised by having a beneficiary serve as
the fiduciary who makes any of these distributions or adjustments. 214
F. Selection of Taxable Year for the Estate or Trust and Shifting of Income
Tax Burdens Among Beneficiaries
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Under section 441, personal representatives and trustees are permitted to choose
a taxable period other than the calendar year and thereby can elect to have the
in the instrument or beneficiary agreement (ACPC chart infra at Appendix: Colorado, n. 15; Delaware,
n.22; Louisiana, nn. 36, 37a; Massachusetts, n.41; New York, n.54; North Carolina, n.61; Ohio,
n.67).
210 See Dobris II, supra note 2, at 328, 330-32.
211 Dobris II, supra note 2, at 335-38; see also Asofsky, supra note 174, at 261.
212 Cf. supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (methods of drafting for Warms adjustment).
213 Although income tax basis considerations can complicate considerably such distribution plan-
ning, some draftsmen include a formula or broad discretion to allow the fiduciary to make adjustments.
Some of these formulae, for instance, guarantee each distributee an amount of income tax basis that
bears the same relationship to total basis as the date of distribution value of the distributee's assets
bears to date of distribution value of all estate or trust assets.
214 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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estate's or trust's first taxable year contain less than twelve months (an estate's
year would begin on the day after the date of the decedent's death and end on
the last day of the month selected).2 15 Most individual distributees will be cal-
endar year taxpayers, and trust distributees may have taxable years different
from that of the estate or distributor trust. 2 16 The selection of a taxable year can
produce inequities similar to those produced by disproportionate distributions of
income and principal: when one beneficiary's income tax planning would be
harmed by a distribution at a particular time but another beneficiary (having a
different taxable year) would be helped, the fiduciary can in fact choose which
to help and which to harm. 217 Assume, for instance, that an estate with a Sep-
tember I to August 31 fiscal year has two distributees, one an individual reporting
on a calendar year basis and the other a trust with an August 1 to July 31 fiscal
year. If the estate makes an August distribution to both, the trust will be able
to defer taxation on its DNI until the end of its next taxable year (therefore, until
the next calendar year), but the individual will have to report his DNI as income
for that calendar year since it is the individual's taxable year in which the estate's
fiscal year ends.218 If an equitable adjustment were made, it presumably would
involve some sharing of the economic value of the greater deferral received by
the trust.
2. Statutory Responses
No statutes deal with this problem.
3. Judicial Responses
No cases were found dealing with this problem.
4. Drafting Solutions
Again, this problem is similar to that of disproportionate DNI distributions. 219
The approach taken for DNI distributions, though, would be impractical for
215 Sections 441(b) and (e) state in pertinent part:
(b) Taxable Year.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "taxable year" means-
(1) the taxpayer's annual accounting period, if it is a calendar year or a fiscal year...
(3) the period for which the return is made; if a return is made for a period less than
12 months ...
(e) Fiscal Year.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "fiscal year" means a period
of 12 months ending on the last day of any month other than December.
I.R.C. § 441(b), (e); see also Regs. §§ 1.441-1, 1.443-1(a)(3). See generally J. PRICE, supra note
2, § 12.9; Conway & Hale, supra note 57, at A-33.
216 Conway & Hale, supra note 57, at A-33.
217 I.R.C. §§ 652(c), 662(c). See Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1906.
218 Maximum deferral is produced if a trust with a January 31 fiscal year is the distributee of an
estate with a February 28 fiscal year. Then, if the estate distributes DNI (earned in 1982) to the
trust in February 1983 and the trust distributes it through to a calendar year beneficiary, he would
include the DNI (originally from 1982) in his 1984 tax return, due April 15, 1985, even though he
received that DNI in February 1983. See J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.09 (illustrating rule of section
662(c)).
219 See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
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selection of a taxable year and would involve an unacceptable administrative
expense. Malcolm Moore was correct in concluding that -[n]o equitable ad-
justment should be called for in this situation; what is required is merely the
realization that interests of beneficiaries may pull in different directions." 22 The
fiduciary advisor has no legal basis for telling the fiduciary to make any such
adjustment, and practical reasons for telling him not to do so. The planner or
draftsman should specifically authorize the fiduciary to elect whatever taxable
year he deems to be in the best interests of all beneficiaries and should relieve
him of any duty to make adjustments. Finally, recall the points above regarding
exculpation and having a beneficiary as fiduciary.
22 1
G. Decisions to Sell or Exchange Estate or Trust Assets and Timing of Those
Sales
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Fiduciaries having discretion to decide whether and when to sell assets can
shift economic interests among beneficiaries. For instance, sales causing rec-
ognition of capital gains taxable to principal beneficiaries during taxable years
when other income is received can trigger the Rice-Dick-Converse problem
discussed above. 222 More generally, when a fiduciary is considering whether to
sell an asset or whether to distribute it in kind with a section 1014 stepped-up
basis or with an increase in basis to its fair market value at the date of distribution,
he must choose between penalizing principal beneficiaries of the distributor trust
or estate (who usually bear the burden of the capital gains tax) or penalizing
distributee beneficiaries (who, because of individual income tax planning and
unrecognized appreciation, could be deterred from then selling the asset). 223 It
is again the combination of the DNI system with income tax basis adjustments
at death and at distribution that produces disparate economic effects for bene-
ficiaries.224
2. Statutory Responses
Under the common law, sales by personal representatives are valid only if
approved by court order, in the absence of specific statutory or testamentary
authorization. 225 Trustees are in a somewhat similar position, but usually have
been held to have the power to sell in the absence of a direction to retain an
asset. 2 26 There appears to be no common law or statutory rule, however, on
adjustment for beneficiaries who suffer disproportionate income tax burdens
because of sales.
220 Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1906.
221 See supra notes 58-61, 63-67 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text; see also Dobris I, supra note 1, at 136-37
(fiduciary often has discretion to decide which assets are to be sold).
223 See supra notes 176-78, 187-89 and accompanying text.
224 See Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1914.
225 E.g., W. BOWE & D. PARKER, 5 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 45.5 (1962); J. RITCHIE, N.
ALFORD and R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1261-64 (6th ed. 1982).
226 E.g., G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 3, § 133; A. ScoTr, supra note 7, § 190.
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3. Judicial Responses
Although analogies exist in cases on adjustments for depreciation and dispro-
portionate distributions of income and principal,227 they do not directly support
claims arising only because of the making or timing of sales or other taxable
exchanges.
4. Drafting Solutions
Planners and draftsmen probably should take the same basic approach sug-
gested for disproportionate distributions of income and principal: adjustment
should not be required, and broad discretion should be granted to the fiduciary
to make sales without regard to capital gains taxation to the trust or estate and
without regard to beneficiaries' income tax considerations. Malcolm Moore has
suggested that it may be appropriate to require an adjustment "to the extent of
capital gains taxes paid" and not "for losses incurred," '228 but such inequities
are just another consequence of multiple beneficiaries having different income
tax goals.2 29 If the transferor is concerned about particular assets the sale of
which will produce extremely large capital gains for principal beneficiaries, he
should either prohibit the sale of such assets (usually unwise) or reallocate
specifically the capital gains tax liability from their sale.
H. Election to Pay Estate Income Taxes in Installments
The personal representative of an estate may elect to pay its income tax in
four equal installments, with the first payable on the due date of the return and
the remaining three due quarterly thereafter. 230 Trustees may not make this
election. No interest need be paid on the installments, 23' thereby reducing the
economic cost of estate income taxation. Hence, failure to elect to pay in in-
stallments has the effect of depriving the estate's income beneficiaries of the
income that could have been earned on the deferred tax. There appear to be no
statutes or judicial decisions discussing this problem as an equitable adjustment
issue, presumably because it involves a different aspect of fiduciary duty than
is discussed above. Election to pay the estate's income tax in installments affects
only one group of beneficiaries-i.e., those who bear the economic burden of
the timing of such income tax payments. Failure to make the election probably
benefits no one. Therefore, no significant issue arises under the duty of impar-
tiality, nor should any arise regarding the self-dealing prohibition. This election
appears to involve only the personal representative's duty to maximize the value of
227 See supra notes 101-16, 156-64 and accompanying text.
228 Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1914.
229 Cf. Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1906, 1914.
230 Section 6152(b) provides in reference to dates prescribed for payment of four installments:
[T]he first installment shall be paid on the date prescribed for the payment of the tax, the
second installment shall be paid on or before 3 months, the third installment on or before
6 months, and the fourth installment on or before 9 months, after such date.
I.R.C. § 6152(b). See generally J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.3.
23 1 Regs. § 1.6152-1.
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the estate by minimizing the economic cost of income taxation.2 32 There probably
is no need to plan or draft explicitly for such an election or to relieve the fiduciary
from the duty to make the election because, in virtually all cases, beneficiaries
cannot be harmed by it.
I. Election to Terminate Subchapter S Qualification
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Personal representatives and trustees under wills of subchapter S corporation
shareholders dying before January 1, 1983 (or dying after that date but during a
subchapter S corporation fiscal year beginning before that date) may elect not to
consent to the corporation's original subchapter S election and thereby terminate
its qualification.233 Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the life income
beneficiary of a so-called "qualified subchapter S trust" holding subchapter S shares.
has a similar election right (that is, not to qualify the trust and, thereby, to terminate
the corporation's qualification for having an unqualified shareholder).234 Under the
Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982,235 however, only personal representatives or
trustees who own more than half of the shares of the corporation and beneficiaries
of "qualified subchapter S trusts" have this election right. 236 An in-depth discussion
of the many factors affecting this election is beyond the scope of this article, but,
simply stated, the passing through of corporate deductions could benefit current
income beneficiaries of an estate or trust or "qualified subchapter S trust," while
increases in corporate value and changes in corporate operations after termination
of the subchapter S election may benefit future income or principal beneficiaries.
237
Presumably, however, beneficiaries of "qualified subchapter S trusts" may elect
based solely on whether these factors favor their individual interests, regardless of
harm caused to future interest holders.
2. Statutory Responses
No statutes discuss adjustment for beneficiaries economically harmed by the
election .238
232 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Cf. I.R.C. § 121(a), (d)(2); Rev. Rul. 82-1, 1982-
1 C.B. 26; Prop. Regs. §8 35.3452(c)-1,35.3453(e)-I, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,376-78, 51,381 (1982)(allowing
middleman "payor" fiduciaries to file exemption certificates to prevent multiple withholding).
233 I.R.C. § 1362(d). Section 1362 was enacted by the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-354, § 2, 96 Stat. 1669. See also Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 § 6 (effective dates
of Act).
234 I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2). For decedents dying prior to the effective date of the Subchapter S
Revision Act of 1982, see I.R.C. § 1371(e), (g). See generally GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note
73, at 148; Conway & Hale, supra note 3, at A-22 to A-23; Stephenson, Effect of Subchapter S in
Lifetime and Post Mortem Planning in Light of Recent Changes, 5 EST. PLAN. 82, 86-88 (1978).
231 See supra note 233.
236 I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1)(B); see also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE ON H.R. 6055, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1982).
237 See REPORT OF THE COMMIrTEE ON FINANCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON H.R. 6055, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-6 (1982); GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 73, at 147. See generally J. PRICE, supra
note 2, § 12.7.
238 But cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45- 100f(24)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982). The statutes grant
fiduciaries the power to "file appropriate consent to the continuation of any subchapter S election
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3. Judicial Responses
No cases discussing this problem were found.
4. Drafting Solutions
The problems of fiduciaries having this right to elect are again similar to those
of fiduciaries having the power to make disproportionate distributions of income
and principal. The fiduciary must consider so many factors in consenting to
continuation of the subchapter S election (not the least of which are possible
fiduciary duties owed to other subchapter S corporation shareholders) that it
would be unreasonably complex and expensive to require adjustments for eco-
nomic harm suffered by beneficiaries because of the election. 23 9 Planners or
draftsmen should give such fiduciaries broad discretion to make all subchapter
S corporate share decisions that are reasonably foreseeable, including discretion
to make this particular election, without regard to economic harm suffered by
any individual beneficiary, and should exculpate fiduciaries from any liability
arising from such decisions.2 ° To avoid self-dealing problems, the fiduciary
should not also be a beneficiary. 24 1 Finally, for draftsmen anticipating that not
more than half of the shares will be transferred to the fiduciary but still desiring
the flexibility of having some individual able to terminate qualification after the
death of the shareholder, the "qualified subchapter S trust" may be a perfect
solution. 24 2 Such draftsmen should recall, however, that the life income bene-
ficiary of the trust has neither the duty to consider other beneficiaries before
making the election nor any apparent duty to make equitable adjustments.
J. Closing the Estate or Terminating the Trust and Disproportionate Sharing
of Benefits or Burdens from Distribution of Loss Carryovers, Excess
Deductions and Capital Gains
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
The election to close an estate or terminate a trust involves two unique fiduciary
income tax effects: (a) beneficiaries receive a proportionate share of capital loss
carryovers, which may be used in beneficiaries' future tax years, and of excess
deductions (i.e., deductions in excess of adjusted gross income), which must be
used in the fiscal year in which the termination distribution is received; and (b)
capital gains are added to DNI during that year and consequently are distributed
to all beneficiaries who receive termination distributions that otherwise carry out
in existence at the time of the testator's death," but only if the testator specifically refers to this
power "in such will or other instrument." This implies that a revocable trust's trustee might be
granted the same power through incorporation by reference. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45- 100f(24)(West
1981 & Supp. 1982).
239 Cf. Dobris II, supra note 2, at 326-32 (factors in determining whether adjustment is an
unreasonable administrative burden).240 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-100f(24), 45-100e(32)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982)(examples
of other powers that may be given to fiduciaries who are expected to manage a small business
interest).
241 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
242 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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DNI.243 If in an estate's final taxable year the only distribution made is of all
remaining estate property to a residuary testamentary or inter vivos trust, any
excess deductions first will benefit the trust's income beneficiaries because the
excess deductions will reduce trust DNI distributable to them. 244 Thus, closing
an estate or terminating a trust raises the same set of general issues as dispro-
portionate distributions of income and principal during administration, as well
as the Rice-Dick-Converse issue discussed above. 245 For example, an individual
beneficiary who has recognized a significant long term capital loss may welcome
a distribution carrying out long term capital gains in his taxable year during
which closing or termination occurs, while a beneficiary not having significant
individual taxable income may resist the passing out of excess deductions which
must be used in his taxable year during which closing or termination occurs.
2. Statutory Responses
No statutes that discuss this problem were found.
3. Judicial Responses
No cases discussing this problem were found.
4. Drafting Solutions
All adjustments probably should be specifically prohibited in this area, and
the fiduciary should be given broad discretion with respect to the timing of
closing the estate or terminating the trust, for the following reasons: (a) few
fiduciaries appear to time closing or termination to favor one group of benefi-
ciaries over another-instead, the election probably is a result of many separate
factors, causing harm to beneficiaries to occur in relatively few cases; and (b)
if there is no intent to favor one group of beneficiaries over another, the ad-
justment would unreasonably increase the complexity and cost of the closing or
termination. Moreover, once this decision to close or terminate has been reached,
no real election is involved that would warrant adjustment.24 6 Therefore, the
instrument simply should prohibit such adjustments, making it unnecessary to
bar a beneficiary from serving as fiduciary.
K. Election to Report Series "E" and "EE" Savings Bond Interest on the
Decedent's Final Income Tax Return
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
United States Series E and EE savings bonds are purchased at a discount and
ordinarily held until maturity without the holder's recognizing any of the annual
2A3 Regs. §§ 1.642(h)-I, -2; i.643(a)-3(d). See also Conway & Hale, supra note 57, at A-34 to
A-35.
244 I.R.C. § 642(h). See generally Estates and Trusts Income Tax Committee, supra note 92, at
867-68; Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1911.
2415 See supra notes 101-08, 111-16, 181-86 and accompanying text.
2 See Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1911.
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interest income until the time of redemption.247 A decedent's executor, or the
trustee of a revocable trust, if required to file the decedent's final income tax
return, is authorized under section 454(a) to report any such unrecognized income
on that return. 248 If the income instead is distributed with the bonds either to a
specific donee or to residuary beneficiaries, there is no recognition on distribution
and the distributee receives the income as IRD249 with the bonds. 250 Reporting
the interest as accrued (recognizing it) on the final return can produce the fol-
lowing effects. Because the income tax due is a debt of the estate, it can reduce
estate tax liability; it also can alter the amount of any will or trust formula gift
based on estate value after deductions. Further, it can increase income tax liability
of a surviving spouse who files jointly with the executor or trustee. 25'
2. Statutory Responses
No statutes directly discussing this problem were found.
3. Judicial Responses
No cases directly discussing this problem were found.
4. Drafting Solutions
Planners or draftsmen first should consider whether resulting income tax li-
ability at the estate or trust level may adversely and significantly affect formula
gifts. In most cases, however, adjustment should be specifically prohibited. Most
inequities will be relatively minor, because the beneficiary who bears the in-
creased income tax liability will receive a reduction in estate tax due to de-
ductibility of that liability on the estate tax return. Even if significant change is
produced in the value of formula gifts, the adjustment will be unreasonably
complex and expensive.252 When the fiduciary distributes such bonds on a non-
pro rata basis and thereby allocates IRD disproportionately, the probability of
significant inequities appears to be so small that no such adjustment should be
allowed. But recall the self-dealing problems that could arise from naming a
beneficiary as the fiduciary who makes the election.253
247 Section 454(a) states in pertinent part:
If, in the case of a taxpayer owning any non-interest-bearing obligation issued at a discount
and redeemable for fixed amounts increasing at stated intervals, . . . the increase in the
redemption price. . . occurring in the taxable year does not. . . constitute income to him
in such year, such taxpayer may, at his election made in his return for any taxable year,
treat such increases as income received in such taxable year.
See generally J. PRIcE, supra note 2, § 12.6; Conway & Hale, supra note 3, at A-5; Dobris II,
supra note 2, at 301-13; Fink, U.S. Series E Bonds: When to Report the Interest After the Owner's
Death, 6 EST. PLAN. 168-73 (1978); Green & Reisman, Handling the Decedent's Final Income Tax
Return for the Best Overall Tax Benefits, 9 EST. PLAN. 348, 351 (1982); Taggart, supra note 3, at
30-31.
24 Regs. § 1.454-1(a). See supra note 19.
249 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
250 See Regs. § 1.691(a)-2(b).
251 See infra text accompanying notes 261-65; see also Dobris II, supra note 2, at 311.
252 See generally Dobris II, supra note 2, at 311.
253 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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L. Election to Deduct Medical Expenses on the Decedent's Final Income Tax
Return or on the Estate Tax Return
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Under section 213, an executor may deduct medical expenses incurred but
not paid prior to death on either the federal estate tax return or the decedent's
Jinal income tax return, if the expenses are paid within one year of death.2 54
This election raises an issue similar to the section 642(g) election to take ad-
ministration expenses and casualty losses on either the fiduciary income tax
return or the estate tax return. For this to be a significant problem, different
beneficiaries must bear the burden of income tax liability on the final return and
the estate tax, or they must receive formula gifts based on estate value after
deductions. 255 In either event, either a Warms or marital-nonmarital formula gift
adjustment in the amount of any economic harm suffered could reasonably be
requested by disadvantaged beneficiaries. 256
2. Statutory Responses
Under the Connecticut Fiduciary Powers Act, if an instrument incorporates
its "administration and other expenses" provision by reference, the fiduciary
may take the same approach to the medical expense deduction adjustment as he
takes to the Warms adjustment: it need be made only if a charitable organization
under section 501(c) is a residuary legatee under a will containing a "preresiduary
marital. . . deduction formula" gift, or if the fiduciary has deducted the medical
expenses on the income tax return and estate taxes "paid from and chargeable
to" principal are increased. 25 7 No other statute directly discusses this problem.
234 Section § 213(c) states in pertinent part:
(1) Treatment of Expenses Paid After Death.-For purposes of subsection (a) [of
§ 213], expenses for the medical care of the taxpayer which are paid out of his estate
during the I-year period beginning with the day after the date of his death shall be treated
as paid by the taxpayer at the time incurred.
(2) Limitation.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply if the amount paid is allowable under
section 2053 as a deduction in computing the taxable estate of the decedent, but this
paragraph shall not apply if (within the time and in the manner and form prescribed by
the Secretary) there is filed-
(A) a statement that such amount has not been allowed as a deduction under section
2053, and
(B) a waiver of the right to have such amount allowed at any time as a deduction under
section 2053.
Section 213 reflects significant amendments by TEFRA, supra note 23, § 202. See TEFRA
§ 202(b)(3)(B) regarding the redesignation of prior section 213(d) as the current section 213(c). See
generally J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.5; Conway & Hale, supra note 3, at A-4 to A-5; Dobris II,
supra note 2, at 307; Green & Reisman, supra note 247, at 351; Taggart, supra note 3, at 27.
253 For a discussion of the marital-nonmarital share adjustment see supra notes 70-73 and accom-
panying text.
256 See Dobris II, supra note 2, at 307-08.
257 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(B)(West Supp. j982).
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3. Judicial Responses
No cases were found directly discussing this problem.
4. Drafting Solutions
Recall the discussion above regarding the Warms adjustment.258 In light of
the lack of statutory or case law on the medical expense deduction election, the
fiduciary advisor probably should refrain from recommending a Warms-type
adjustment in this situation. Nonetheless, the planner or draftsman should spe-
cifically state the transferor's intent about this adjustment and probably should
prohibit it. This is because few decedents' final income tax returns will be
sufficiently simple to permit use of an adjustment formula and in most estates
the gain in equity from the adjustment will be more than counterbalanced by the
increase in complexity and administrative expense.59 Thus, the instrument should
specifically authorize the election and prohibit the adjustment; if for some reason
discretionary adjustment is permitted, exculpation should be provided. The self-
dealing problems with a beneficiary serving as fiduciary should be considered.2 6°
M. Election to File the Decedent's Final Income Tax Return Jointly with the
Surviving Spouse
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Under section 6013(a), the executor can elect to file the decedent's final income
tax return jointly with the surviving spouse.2 61 This return will include income
received by the decedent individually through the date of his death and the
surviving spouse's income for the entire year. 262 Because the fiduciary thereby
subjects himself to joint and several liability for the entire income tax, the election
to file jointly may not benefit the estate or trust as a whole, depending on, among
other things, whether the surviving spouse agrees to pay her pro rata share of
the tax. 26
3
If a joint return is filed, the surviving spouse shares the benefit of the decedent
spouse's deductions, capital loss carryovers and the like; the fiduciary gets the
possibility of lower rates, deductions attributable to the surviving spouse and
more advantageous maximum tax treatment. 26" If the surviving spouse is not an
estate or trust beneficiary, an election benefitting the surviving spouse may be
258 See supra notes 19-69 and accompanying text.
259 Calculating the economic benefit or harm from this election is difficult because, while deducting
medical expenses on the income tax return might appear to increase the taxable estate (by decreasing
the debt deduction for income taxes due on the final income tax return), their deduction on the estate
tax return directly reduces the taxable estate even more. Green & Reisman, supra note 247, at 351.
260 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
261 I.R.C. § 6013(a)(3) provides in part: "[I]n the case of death of one spouse or both spouses
the joint return with respect to the decedent may be made only by his executor or administrator
... " See also Taggart, supra note 3, at 17-18, 22-27. See generally J. PRiCE, supra note 2, §
12.4; Green & Reisman, supra note 247, at 351-53.
262 Regs. § 1.6013-1(d).
263 Conway & Hale, supra note 3, at A-3 to A-4.
264 See Taggart, supra note 3, at 22; Green & Reisman, supra note 247, at 352.
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an obvious violation of fiduciary duty. If the surviving spouse is a beneficiary,
however, then that spouse may merely be disproportionately benefitted from
the election (presumably, to the disadvantage of residuary or other benefi-
ciaries who bear the decedent's debts, including income tax liability under
his final return).2 65
2. Statutory Responses
Connecticut's statutory power, if incorporated by reference into the instru-
ment, authorizes the executor 266 to file jointly with the surviving spouse and
to "pay the entire amount of such" income tax without thereby incurring
"personal liability." ' 267 Although the power does not directly address the
issue of equitable adjustments,2 68 it should protect a fiduciary refusing to
adjust after electing to file jointly or after paying a portion of the surviving
spouse's share of the income tax.
3. Judicial Responses
No cases were found directly discussing this problem.
4. Drafting Solutions
Most decedents will want the fiduciary to file jointly with the surviving
spouse, without having to make any adjustment. If so, to clarify the decedent's
intent the adjustment probably should be prohibited in the instrument. 269
Further, calculation of such an adjustment would be complex and expensive
and should be prohibited for that reason alone. If the decedent does not want
the fiduciary to benefit the surviving spouse through the election, he should
direct the fiduciary to bargain with the surviving spouse for a reasonable
contractual apportionment of the income tax liability.2 7° If such a direction
is given, however, the fiduciary should be exculpated from any claim arising
from the apportionment agreement. Again, recall the obvious self-dealing
problems with having the surviving spouse (or another interested beneficiary)
as the fiduciary authorized to elect.2 7'
265 See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text (discussing inequities resulting from the medical
expense deduction election).
266 Another fiduciary having the duty to file the final income tax return also should be covered.
See supra note 19 (meaning of "executor").
267 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100(e)(35)(C)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982).The statute
provides:
The fiduciary is specifically authorized but not required to execute and file a joint income
tax return with the surviving spouse or his executor or administrator for the year of the
decedent's death and for any prior years. . . .The fiduciary shall incur no personal liability
for any action taken by it in good faith in accordance with. . . the foregoing [authorization].
268 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100(e)(35)(A), (B) with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
45-100(e)(35)(C)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
269 Professor Dobris characterizes this as a remission of fiduciary duty argument. Dobris II, supra
note 2, at 284-89.
270 Cf. supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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N. Decisions Not to Exclude or Not to Resist Inclusion of Property in the
Decedent's Estate Tax Gross Estate
Several commentators have referred to the practical ability of a fiduciary
to decide not to resist inclusion of inter vivos trust property in the gross estate
under section 2036 (dealing with a retained life estate in the trust property
or powers to alter beneficial enjoyment), section 2037 (involving certain
contingent reversions) or section 2038 (involving retained powers to alter,
amend or revoke) as an "election" potentially giving rise to adjustment
claims. 27 2 Such inclusion in the gross estate can reallocate economic benefits
to beneficiaries bearing the estate tax burden for farm or closely held business
assets, 273 to beneficiaries seeking an increase in income tax basis of included
assets under section 1014 (to minimize later capital gains taxation on their
sale or other taxable exchange) 274 or away from beneficiaries who bear the
burden of increased estate taxes.
A similar issue arises relating to whether a fiduciary filing the estate tax
return excludes joint ownership property (other than that held by a married
couple) under section 2040(a) because it is attributable to contributions by a
person other than the decedent. 275 If the other joint owner or owners are not
obligated to pay the estate tax on such excludible joint ownership property, 276
they can benefit from its inclusion in the gross estate because of the possible
increase in income tax basis under section 1014(b)(9).
Nevertheless, the fiduciary does not have an "election" in the equitable
adjustment sense for either type of exclusion. First, the fiduciary filing the
estate tax return must give a "true, correct, and complete" statement of all
272 I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2037, 2038. See generally Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2,
1905. Dobris states:
Usually an executor fights to exclude an item from the gross estate to save death taxes.
Therefore the Government will readily allow an executor to include property. Occasionally,
an executor might wish to include property to increase its income tax basis, or to meet
Internal Revenue Code percentage requirements for relief provisions. Thus, when a par-
ticular asset raises close questions of law or fact as to its includibility in the gross estate,
the executor in effect possesses a discretionary power to include it.
Dobris II, supra note 2, at 314-15. Cf. I.R.C. § 2033 (property in which the decedent had an
interest), 2041 (general powers of appointment), 2042 (proceeds of life insurance), 2043 (transfers
for insufficient consideration).
273 See generally infra notes 297-323.
274 See generally I.R. C. § 1014; Regs. §§ 1.1014-1 to-9.
275 Regarding spousal joint ownership, ERTA, supra note 18, § 403, created an entirely different
rule for "joint interests of husband and wife" under section § 2040(b)(1). The Act provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), in the case of any [interests in property held by the decedent
and the decedent's spouse as tenants by the entirety or joint tenants with right of survi-
vorship, but only if the decedent and the spouse of the decedent are the only joint tenants],
the value included in the gross estate with respect to such interest by reason of this section
is one-half of the value of such qualified joint interest.
ERTA, supra note 18, § 403. Thus, this section has no application whatsoever to § 2040(b) spousal
joint ownership. Regarding § 2040(a), see H. DUBROFF & D. KAHN, supra note 175, 7.1; see also
Regs. § 20.2040-1 (a)(general discussion of joint interests).
276 See REv. UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT AcT § 2, 8 U.L.A. 159, 160 (1964).
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assets.277 Strictly speaking, then, no fiduciary choice exists. Second, even if the
fiduciary has a choice about inclusion of assets, few state court judges will try
to decide adjustment claims by speculating about final includibility, valuation
of assets and eventual tax effects on all beneficiaries. Third, if an adjustment is
sought because of inclusion, to grant relief the state court judge would have to
contradict the outcome of the federal estate tax proceeding. If adjustment is
sought because of exclusion, the court would have to find that the fiduciary
violated the federal tax laws. State court judges probably would, and should,
avoid such "no win" situations. Regarding, in particular, exclusion of joint
ownership value because of contribution by someone other than the decedent,
not only does section 2040(a) appear to contemplate that the executor will inform
the Service about all such excludible amounts, but also the tax laws do not
explicitly recognize any other possible use of this exclusion. Nothing in the
capital gains provisions evidences a congressional intent that the fiduciary be
able to choose the income tax basis for such a potentially excludible property
interest.
278
0. Election to Include Lump Sum Distributions from a Qualified Benefit Plan
or Individual Retirement Account ("IRA") or to Exclude $100,000 of
Installment Distributions from the Decedent's Gross Estate
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Here a trustee has a true tax election to make. A trustee who has been des-
ignated as the beneficiary (distributee) of a decedent's account in a qualified
benefit plan or IRA can, if the plan permits, elect either of the following methods
of distribution: (a) distribution of the proceeds of the account in installments,
thereby causing ordinary income taxation of any employer contribution portion
of each installment as it is received and making up to $100,000 of the proceeds
eligible for exclusion from the decedent's gross estate under section 2039(c), or
277 See Internal Revenue Service Form 706 (Rev. June 1982), notation on page 1 above the
signature line. See generally IRM 4350, EXAMINATION TECHNIQUE HANDBOOK FOR ESTATE TAX
EXAMINERS 352, (I 1)30-(1 1)40 (1980).
278 Section 6659 may impose a penalty tax on any distributee selling an asset subject to such a
"valuation overstatement." ERTA, supra note 18, § 722; see also GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra
note 73, at 332-35.
There may be many areas of fiduciary administration in which the fiduciary has the practical
freedom to disobey the law. To extend the remedy of equitable adjustment into such areas, however,
would be to pervert its essentially equitable nature by presupposing court findings of economic
entitlement based upon essentially unlawful or inequitable conduct by fiduciaries.
Commentators have suggested that the discretion of the fiduciary filing the federal estate tax return
to determine asset value under section 2031 when no clear fair market value exists is another such
fiduciary "election." See, e.g. Barton, supra note I1, 902.2; Dobris II, supra note 2, at 313-14;
Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1912. This is another false "election," however,
for the reasons noted above. It also seems unlikely that any state court would order an adjustment
unless it were prepared further to determine the precise fair market value of the asset. Thus, such
adjustments would be impractical-if there is sufficient uncertainty about valuation to allow a de
facto election, how can a court or fiduciary be expected to determine a precise amount by which to
reduce one beneficiary's interest or increase another's interest?
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(b) distribution of the proceeds in a lump sum (within one calendar year), thereby
requiring their complete inclusion in the gross estate and qualifying plan proceeds
(but not IRA proceeds) for income taxation under special ten-year averaging. 279
Even if lump sum distribution is elected, the fiduciary distributee of a qualified
plan (but not an IRA) can forego special ten-year averaging for the distribution
and still make it eligible for exclusion from the gross estate. 28" Because of the
new unlimited marital deduction, elections by a surviving spouse of a decedent
dying after January 1, 1982, to receive a lump sum distribution individually and
to take advantage of special ten-year averaging will generate no additional estate
tax liability and should give rise to no adjustment problem, even if the spouse
is also a fiduciary.28 '
2. Statutory Responses
Connecticut's statutory power, if incorporated by reference into the instrument,
specifically authorizes the fiduciary to make this election without personal lia-
bility.282 Neither the Connecticut power nor any statute directly discusses ad-
justment to beneficiaries' accounts to remedy inequities caused by the election.
3. Judicial Responses
A few courts have placed estate tax liability for such distributions on the
279 See J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.21; Rich, The Decedent's Pension Plan: Estate Tax Exclusion
or Income Tax Averaging?, POST MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 95-102 (P. Asofsky ed. 1981); Moore,
Conflicting Interests 1978, supra note 1, 607.1-607.4; see also I.R.C. §§ 72, 402, 403, 408 and
2039(c), (f), (g), and the regulations thereunder. Section 245 of TEFRA (I.R.C. § 2039(g)) placed
a $100,000 limit on the section 2039(c) exclusion for decedents dying after December 31, 1982.
But cf. I.R.C. § 2517(b)(unchanged by TEFRA). See Sollee, TEFRA's Impact on Qualified Plans,
5 NAT'L L.J. 15, 17-18 (1982).
At the time of writing, all that is clear about section 2039(g) is that it will complicate tax planning
substantially. Until the Service discloses, among other things, how it intends to collect estate taxes
due on undistributed installment or annuity payments, it is impossible to say how much complication
will result.
If an executor or administrator is the designated beneficiary, this designation results in automatic
inclusion of the proceeds in the gross estate under section 2039(c); if a beneficiary, such as a
surviving spouse, is individually designated as beneficiary and also is appointed personal represen-
tative, however, exclusion of the proceeds from the gross estate is still possible. See Moore,
Conflicting Interests 1978, supra note 2, 607.3.
280 See I.R.C. §§ 402(a), 403(a), § 2039(f); Regs. § 20.2039-4(c)(1981). Income tax free roll-
over of a lump sum distribution into an IRA appears to be possible for an individual surviving spouse
distributee, but not for a spouse serving as a fiduciary. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(5), (7); see also I.R.C.
§§ 408(d)(3), 408(a)(7), regarding required IRA distributions after death.
281 See generally ERTA, supra note 18, § 403 (marital deduction amendments).
282 The Connecticut statute provides the fiduciary with the following power:
To elect, either revocably or irrevocably, to receive death benefits and any other sums
payable with respect to any pension and profit-sharing plans in a lump sum, in instalments
[sic] or as an annuity; to waive the benefit of any income averaging provisions available
for distributions from pension and profit-sharing plans; to elect a different mode of dis-
tribution with respect to each applicable pension and profit-sharing plan. . . . A decedent's
spouse, if acting as a fiduciary, shall take no part in the exercise of any election under
any pension or profit-sharing plan.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(G)(West Supp. 1982). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-100e(35)(H)(West Supp. 1982)(fiduciary not personally liable for action taken to implement
election); REV. UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT § 2, 8 U.L.A. 159-60 (1964).
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designated beneficiary and have removed it from other estate or trust benefici-
aries.283 No case, however, has ordered an adjustment as such.
4. Drafting Solutions
The problems arising from this election should not be resolved by requiring
adjustment of beneficiary accounts. 28 4 The draftsman should attack this problem
directly through the instrument's death tax allocation clause. For instance, if a
qualified plan participant wishes to prevent inequity, he would be better advised
simply to exclude any plan distribution from the coverage of the general estate
tax apportionment clause of his will or trust (or both), perhaps supplementing
this with a statement of intent in the beneficiary designation that the designated
beneficiary is to bear all estate tax liability attributable to the distribution. 28
5 If
the conflict is not so removed, the participant can be presumed to have favored
the designated beneficiary over other beneficiaries potentially bearing the estate
tax burden, and therefore no equitable adjustment should be ordered. 286 Finally,
it is preferable for a fiduciary designated as beneficiary not to have an individual
beneficial interest in the proceeds because of self-dealing problems. 287 Often,
however, the plan participant will want to create such a conflict of interest, for
example, by having a surviving spouse trustee. If so, this intention should be
explicitly set forth in the instrument (and perhaps the beneficiary designation),
and the fiduciary should be expressly absolved of any duty to make equitable
adjustments. 288
P. Election to Use the Alternate Valuation Date for Estate Tax Valuation
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Under section 2032, the fiduciary may elect to value the gross estate on the
federal estate tax return as of the date of death or the alternate valuation date.
For each gross estate asset, the latter date is the earlier of six months after the
date of death and the date of the asset's distribution, sale, exchange or other
283 See First Nat'l Bank of Shelby v. Dixon, 38 N.C. App. 430, 435-36, 248 S.E.2d 416, 419-
20 (1978). Cf. Roe v. Farrell, 69 II1. 2d 525, 529-30, 372 N.E.2d 662, 664, (1978)(in absence of
federal law, states are free equitably to apportion federal estate tax liability and costs of administration
between probate and nonprobate assets).
284 See generally ACPC chart, infra at Appendix, questions 7.a. and 7.b. No jurisdiction appears
to require adjustment and none appears to have a practice of making it. But see ACPC chart, infra
at Appendix, n. 16 (Colorado practice); n.48 (Nevada practice).
285 See, e.g., D. WESTFALL, supra note 74, 6.02; Barton, supra note 11, 903.2; Suter, Careful
Drafting of Apportionment Clauses Can Ensure Tax Burden Will Fall Where Client Intends, 9 EST.
PLAN 156, 157 (1982); Suter, Techniques to Apportion Estate Taxes Will Have to be Reviewed Due
to the New Tax Law, 9 EST. PLAN. 96, 99 (1982).
286 This, of course, is Professor Dobris' remission of fiduciary duty approach. See Dobris II,
supra note 2, at 283-90 (judicial toleration of disproportionate allocation when a dispositive instru-
ment contains an express or implied setting aside of the duty of impartiality).
287 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
28 Query: if all fiduciary duty is removed, would this "election" in fact be a general power of
appointment? See generally I.R.C. §§ 2041, 2514, and the regulations thereunder. Cf. Britenstool
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 711 (1966), acq., Rev. Rul. 78-445, 1978-2 C.B. 242.
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disposition.289 If the beneficiaries bearing the estate tax burden are not identical
to those receiving the asset (and therefore bearing the burden of potential capital
gains taxation on sale or other exchange of the property), higher overall values
will benefit those having a relatively small estate tax burden and paying income
tax at relatively high rates, while lower overall values will benefit those bene-
ficiaries having a relatively large estate tax burden and paying income tax at
relatively low rates.29 ° Perhaps more importantly, election of higher overall
values may significantly increase the size of formula gifts, or affect qualification
under the Code's actual use valuation provisions for farm and other family
business real property or under its closely held business estate tax deferral pro-
visions. 2 9' Any equitable adjustment for such inequities can involve either real-
location on a pro rata basis of the total economic value of all tax benefits resulting
from the election, or instead only compensation for any beneficiary who suffers
significant economic harm from the election.
2. Statutory Responses
Three state statutes limit the availability of an adjustment. The Connecticut
statutory power, if incorporated into the instrument, takes the most direct ap-
proach, relieving the fiduciary of the duty to make adjustments in all alternate
valuation date situations .292 The Maryland and New York statutes are compul-
sory, but only cover an instrument giving the surviving spouse an amount de-
termined under a formula based on the amount of the federal estate tax marital
deduction: both negate any duty to adjust and explicitly remove any further duty
to elect the valuation date that will cause the greater marital deduction gift. 293
None of these statutes directly deals with harm suffered by beneficiaries because
of disqualification under the farm and family business relief provisions referred
to above.
3. Judicial Responses
While at least two New York cases have referred to this election, neither
289 I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1), (2); see also Regs. § 20.2032-1(c).
29 See generally J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.17; Conway & Hale, supra note 3, at A-8 to A-
10; Dobris II, supra note 2, at 302-06; Moore, Conflicting Interests 1978, supra note 2, 602.6,
604; Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1903; Weigel & Trost, supra note 2, at
133.
291 See infra text accompanying notes 297-323 (discussions of the farm and closely-held business
relief provisions).
292 The Connecticut statute provides:
The fiduciary may elect to value the estate [as of] the date of the decedent's death or [as
of the alternate] valuation date, . . . whether or not such election increases or decreases
the federal estate tax. No adjustments shall be required to be made between income and
principal or between the property interests passing to any beneficiaries . . . as a result of
such an election.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(A)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982).293See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 11-1.2(B)(McKinney Supp. 1982-83); MD. EST. & TRUST
CODE § 11-106 (1974); see also Dobris II, supra note 2, at 306 n.226 ("[A] New York court
exercising its equitable powers would also reject any equitable adjustment for the death tax increase").
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required that such an adjustment be made. 2 94 It appears that no other courts have
directly discussed this problem.
4. Drafting Solutions
In light of current practices, 295 the following guidelines are suggested:
a. Simple Estate and Income Tax Returns. When the planner or draftsman
expects the fiduciary to face relatively simple estate and income tax results from
the election, he could reasonably include an adjustment formula based upon a
pro rata sharing of any economic harm flowing from the election and readily
quantifiable by the claiming beneficiary. This approach probably would not work
if qualification for farm and family business relief provisions were at issue.
b. Complicated Estate and Income Tax Returns. In some cases, a discretionary
grant of authority to make adjustments, framed in broad terms and buttressed
with broad exculpation, may be appropriate. Such discretion would be the only
reasonable manner of allowing the fiduciary to adjust for essentially speculative
economic harm. For example, a surviving spouse's marital deduction formula
gift may be reduced when other elections have been made to increase the gift's
value and disqualification under the actual use valuation has resulted. Unless
there is a substantial likelihood that such economic harm will be suffered, how-
ever, this adjustment is essentially speculative and should be prohibited.
Thus, in most situations, this adjustment would be unreasonably complex and
expensive and in most instruments should be prohibited. Although the risks of
self-dealing and lack of impartiality will be present when a beneficiary (partic-
ularly, the surviving spouse) serves as fiduciary,2 96 many transferors will have
good reasons for assuming these risks.
Q. Election to Value Farm or Other Closely Held Business Real Property
Based on Its Actual Use, Not on Fair Market Value
Section 2032A permits an executor to elect to value qualifying farm or other
closely held business real property based on its actual use, reducing the land's
value for estate tax purposes by up to $750,000 for decedents dying in 1983 and
thereafter.297 Qualification depends on satisfaction of complicated conditions
294 See In re McTarnahan's Estate, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 14, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County 1960)(no equitable adjustment ordered when fiduciary's election under section 642(g) to
apply administration expenses as a credit against estate income taxes resulted in an increase in size
of gift to surviving spouse); In re Estate of Yalden, 175 N.Y.L.J. 13 (Sur. Ct. Queens County June
24, 1976)(fiduciary failed to elect alternate date and was surcharged; no equitable adjustment made
among beneficiaries' interests).
295 See ACPC chart infra at Appendix, questions 5.a., 5.b. In only one state, California, might
adjustment be required (but see ACPC chart at Appendix n. 12); and in only two states, Oklahoma
and Nevada, is adjustment a common practice (but see ACPC chart at Appendix n.48, Nevada
fiduciary has absolute discretion). For information on negative responses regarding practices, see
infra ACPC chart at Appendix nn.24 (District of Columbia, exception for unusual circumstances),
69 (Oregon, adversely affected beneficiary must consent to any adjustment).
296 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text; see also Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975,
supra note 2, 1915.
297 See ERTA, supra note 18, § 421 (I.R.C. §§ 1040, 2032A amendments). For the most
authoritative, and possibly the best, explanation of current section 2032A, see GENERAL ExPLA-
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regarding use and disposition of the real property and the conduct of family
members, both before and after death.298 Qualification permits valuation under
a net rent capitalization method or a vague multiple factor method; experience
has shown that the former often produces remarkably low values.299 Retaining
qualification after death is also subject to complicated requirements on contin-
uation of the business use, continued ownership and continued family business
participation for ten years. 3" If the postmortem requirements are not met, a
recapture tax is imposed in the amount of the estate tax reduction attributable
to the reduced value of the property.3 °" Finally, the income tax basis of such
property is adjusted to the actual use value, not the fair market value, but may
be increased to the fair market value if the recapture tax is paid, provided that
the qualified family devisee also pays interest on the recapture tax amount from
the date on which the estate tax was originally due.3 °2
Clearly, this provision may be advantageous to devisees bearing the estate tax
burden for the real property, but may penalize devisees wishing to sell the
property or otherwise end its farm or business use.303 Although one group of
beneficiaries may receive the benefit of the election and another may receive its
cost, an equitable adjustment should never be necessary. First, the better drafting
practice is to allocate all estate tax liability attributable to such specially valued
property directly to the family members receiving it. 3° Second, and more im-
portantly, to make a qualifying election the fiduciary must provide the Service
with an agreement signed by all persons having an interest in the property, in
which they consent to personal liability for and collection of any recapture tax
eventually payable on account of the qualified property. 3 5 Such "interested
parties" include every person with a conceivable right to challenge payment of
NATION, supra note 73, at 244-54; see also J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.18; Committee on Tax
Legislation and Regulations, Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, American Bar Asso-
ciation, Special Rules for Valuation and Deferral of Payment of Taxes, Recommendations for
Regulations and Legislative Changes Regarding I.R.C. § 2032A, 17 REAL PROP. PRoE. & TR. J.
321 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Recommendations for I.R.C. § 2032A].
298 See also GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 73, at 244-48, 249-51 (effect of ERTA, supra
note 18, on section 2032A predeath qualification requirements, election requirements, valuation
requirements and postdeath recapture rules). See generally I.R.C. § 2032A(a) to (c). Regarding
premortem qualification, see Regs. §§ 20.2032A-3, 20.2032A-4.
299 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7)(net rent capitalization method), (e)(8)(multiple factor method). The
former subsection utilizes the reciprocal of a five-year average for Federal Land Bank interest rates.
See also Hartley, Final Regulations under 2032A: Who, What and How to Qualify for Special Use
Valuation, 53 J. TAX'N 306 (1980). See generally Recommendations for I.R.C. § 2032A, supra note
297, at 329-31, 334-38 (discussion of valuation under section 2032A(e)(7) and (e)(8)).
31 See generally I.R.C. § 2032A(c).
301 I.R.C. § 2032A(c). See also I.R.C. § 6324B and the regulations thereunder; § 6325; Rec-
ommendations for I.R.C. § 2032A, supra note 297, at 326 (subordination of recapture tax lien
imposed by section 6324B).
302 See I.R.C. § 1016(c); GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 73, at 250-51.
303 The most thoughtful discussion of this equitable adjustment topic appears in Barton, supra
note 11, 902.2, 902.3. See also Weigel & Trost, supra note 2, at 135.
3o4 See Barton, supra note 11, 902.2, 902.3.
305 Regs. § 20.2032A-8(c)(1)(1981). See also I.R.C. §§ 6324B(d), 6325. The family members
can avoid such personal liability, however, if they post bond in compliance with section 2032A(c)(1 1).
I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(5).
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that tax, with the exception of potential will contestants and creditors of the
decedent.3"6 Thus, although beneficiaries may disagree as to the overall benefit
of the election, all must consent for it to be valid. If any beneficiary were later
to claim economic harm because of the election, he presumably would be es-
topped from seeking an equitable adjustment. 307 Finally, any such adjustment
would inevitably be complex and costly, and for this reason alone should be
prohibited.
R. Tender of Closely Held Corporate Stock For Redemption and Use of
Proceeds to Pay Death Taxes and Other Qualified Expenses
Under section 303, any beneficiary or other distributee who receives certain
closely held corporate stock included in a decedent's gross estate, the value of
which exceeds thirty-five percent of the gross estate's value (minus amounts
deductible under sections 2053 and 2054), and who is liable for death taxes,
funeral costs and administration expenses, may tender the stock for redemption
and treat gain on the redemption as long term capital gain. 3 8 Although equitable
adjustment may be possible in connection with section 303 redemptions, the
only beneficiaries potentially harmed by such a redemption are those tendering
the stock. The redemption clearly cannot qualify under section 303 unless the
beneficiaries receiving the stock are directly liable for those taxes and ex-
penses. 3 9 Further, Professor Babette Barton has warned that an equitable ad-
306 Regs. § 20.2032A-8(c)(2). This subsection restricts a qualifying "interest in property" to one
which "as of the date of the decedent's death, can be asserted under applicable local law so as to
affect the disposition of the specially valued property by the estate." Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
the interest can be future or contingent. Id. See generally infra note 341 and accompanying text
(consensual adjustment may require appointment of guardian ad litem for minor, unborn, contingent
or unascertainable beneficiaries). By sufficiently limiting all future and contingent interests in the
real property, the decedent may eliminate the need to have guardians ad litem appointed to sign the
consent agreement on behalf of the beneficiaries of those interests. Such beneficiaries, however,
probably could not claim an equitable adjustment based on the special use valuation election. See
generally Recommendations for I.R.C. § 2032A, supra note 297, at 326.
307 But see CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(F), (H)(West Supp. 1982)(fiduciary authorized
to make all elections respecting valuations authorized by section 2032A, without incurring personal
liability for action taken or omitted in good faith). Connecticut's provision implies that at least some
legislators fear that equitable adjustment claims may arise from the election.
301 I.R.C. § 303. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 73, at 255-58 (explaining prior law and
1981 amendments to section 303). See also J. PRICE, supra note 2, §§ 11.14-11.21; Kahn, Closely-
Held Stocks-Deferral and Financing of Estate Tax Costs Through Sections 303 and 6166, 35 TAX
LAWYER 639, 640-46, 658, 664-76 (1982).
3-9 I.R.C. § 303(b)(3). Cf. Moore, Conflicting Interests 1978, supra note 2, 608 (whether
expenses taken as income or estate tax deductions makes no difference in meeting qualifying per-
centage tests of section 303(b)(2)(A)). A problem appears to be raised under section 6166, which
allows deferral of estate tax payments for that portion of the tax attributable to closely held business
interests if the value of those interests exceeds 35% of the adjusted gross estate. I.R.C. § 6166(a)(1).
A section 303 redemption generally is not a disposition of the family business interest that can result
in acceleration of the deferred estate tax liability under section 6166(g). See I.R.C. § 6166(g)(l)(A),
(B). If the section 303 redemption does not qualify under the explicit terms of section 6166(g)(1)(B)(which
requires the proceeds to be used to make qualifying payments within one year), however, acceleration
can occur. This conflict is more apparent than real, however, because section 303 specifically requires
that the owner of such stock be personally liable for death tax payments and therefore it is unlikely
that payments other than for federal estate tax will cause the 50% threshold of section 6166(g)(l)(A)
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justment after a section 303 redemption could be disastrous: "[A] compensating
adjustment, in the form of a reduction in taxes apportioned to such shareholders,
would pro tanto sacrifice a right to relief under I.R.C. Section 303."13'0
S. Election to Defer Automatically Payment of Estate Tax Attributable to
Closely Held Businesses
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Pursuant to section 6166, an executor holding a qualifying closely held busi-
ness interest may elect to defer payment of the estate tax attributable to that
interest for five years and to pay it in up to ten annual installments.3 1 During
the deferral period, the fiduciary must pay interest on unpaid tax.312 The provision
imposes interest charges as follows: on $345,800 reduced by the amount of the
credit allowable under section 2010(a), at four percent per year; and on the tax
attributable to the rest of the business interest, at the then effective general rate
for unpaid taxes.3 13 If an interest or estate tax installment payment is missed, 314
if the fiduciary accumulates undistributed income in the estate31 5 or if more than
fifty percent of the original value is withdrawn (through sale of the interest or
other withdrawal of value from the business), 316 the obligation to pay is accel-
erated and the right to deferral is terminated. 3 7 Thus, the election to terminate
deferral is an additional election available to a fiduciary receiving such a business
interest.
Conflicts among beneficiaries arise when different groups bear the burdens
or reap the benefits of the election or termination. For instance, one group of
beneficiaries may bear the burden of the interest payable on deferred tax, while
another group receives reduced income because section 6166 effectively bars
reinvestment in a different business.3 18 Still another group of beneficiaries may
bear an additional risk of loss due to retention of the business interest. 3 9 Hence,
to be exceeded. See generally infra notes 311-21 and accompanying text (discussion of section
6166).
310 Barton, supra note 11, 902.2, at 9-52 n.73.
311 I.R.C. § 6166(a)(1). The heading of section 6166(a) is misleading because only a nine-year
"installment payment" period is involved. See also ERTA, supra note 18, § 422 (amendments to
section 6166); GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 73, at 255-58; J. PRICE, supra note 2, §§ 11.26-
11.31; Kahn, supra note 308, at 646-49, 651-55, 664-81. See generally Regs. §§ 20.6166-1,
20.6166A-1, 20.6166A-2.
312 I.R.C. § 6166(f)(1).
313 See Kahn, supra note 308, at 650. See also I.R.C. §§ 6601(j), 6621(b). Compare I.R.C.
§ 6601(j)(2)(establishing interest rate of four percent on deferral amount of up to $345,800 minus
"credit allowable under section 2010(a)") with I.R.C. § 2001(c)(tax of $345,800 imposed on estate
of $1,000,000).
314 I.R.C. § 6166(g)(3).
315 I.R.C. § 6166(g)(2).
316 I.R.C. § 6166(g)(1).
3 17 I.R.C. § 6166(g). See also I.R.C. §§ 6324A, 6325; Regs. §§ 20.6324A-1, 20.6325-1,
301.6324A-1. See generally Kahn, supra note 308, at 655-64.
311 I.R.C. § 6166(g)(1).
311 See Professor Barton's explanation of how inequities can arise under this election:
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an equitable adjustment decision would be complicated by the varying needs
and expectations of such beneficiaries regarding business performance during
the deferral period. If the election requires the decedent's estate to remain open
during the deferral period, perhaps with a personal representative retaining legal
title to the business interest, any beneficiary whose right to income does not
commence until final distribution will be penalized.32 ° Further, administration
expenses that can be deducted either on the fiduciary income tax or the estate
tax return may be significantly increased, perhaps thereby necessitating further
Warms adjustments.32 '
2. Statutory Responses
Connecticut's statutory power, if incorporated by reference into the instrument,
deals indirectly with the adjustment issue: "The fiduciary is authorized in its
discretion to elect to pay ... any part of the federal estate tax ... [under
section] 6166. '-322 Any fiduciary taking "action ... in good faith under said
authorization" is specifically relieved of "personal liability" for making the
election. 323 No other statute directly discusses this election problem.
3. Judicial Responses
No cases were found directly discussing this problem.
4. Drafting Solutions
If one group of beneficiaries bears the burden of estate taxes on the business
interest, another group bears the burden of interest charges on deferred tax, a
third group is harmed by lower earnings from the business and a fourth bears
the risk that the business interest will decline in value, at least four separate
[Tihe one complication, as with all elections, is that the benefits and brunt may not be
distributed ratably among beneficiaries. In fact, precisely the same conflicts adverted to
earlier, in connection with . . .[the Warms election, supra notes 29-69 and accompanying
text] will arise here, since the interest assessed for the privilege of deferral is now settled
to be deductible either as an administrative expense on the estate tax return or as a deduction
on the estate's income tax return....
Either way, equitable assignments and adjustments among beneficiaries necessitate precise
ascertainment both of the potential economic gains and costs of deferral and of the respective
participants in each. [Tihe potential net economic gain ... consists of the difference
between after-tax investment income from the deferred tax dollars . . . over after-tax costs
of deferral. . . .In other words, the overall net economic gain from deferral is a function
of four factors, [gross investment income, income taxes, actual interest charges for deferral
and income or estate tax savings from their deduction], the amount . . . of which turns
on actions by the fiduciary .. . .However, the incidence of these four factors, or fiduciary
actions to maximize the gain, is borne differently by individual beneficiaries.
Barton, supra note I1, 902.2 [footnotes omitted].
320 See IND. CODE § 29-1-17-7 (1976)(unless decedent's will otherwise provides, all income
received by personal representative during administration of estate constitutes asset of estate and, if
not expended during administration, augments residue).
321 See supra notes 19-69 and accompanying text.
322 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(D)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
323 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(H)(West Supp. 1982).
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drafting goals must be reconciled: minimizing estate taxes, minimizing interest
charges, maximizing current business income and facilitating reinvestment of
trust or estate assets. To the extent possible, draftsmen should place all of these
risks and burdens on the same group of beneficiaries. If the transferor disapproves
of this direct approach, he probably should give the fiduciary broad discretion
to make the election (and, perhaps, to terminate deferral) and grant equally broad
exculpation to the fiduciary from any resulting claim. Such exculpation should
not be so broad as to exonerate the fiduciary, for example, for negligent failure
to pay interest or negligent withdrawals from the business causing acceleration
and loss of the deferral benefits. Consider, however, the fiduciary's dilemma
regarding reinvestment: how can a fiduciary safely elect to defer estate tax
payment when the acceleration provisions of section 6166 imply a virtual refusal
to reinvest when otherwise reasonable?
T. Election to Defer Estate Tax Payments on Remainder Interests and to
Request Discretionary Deferral of Estate Tax Payments
Sections 6163 and 6161 appear to present similar issues. Section 6163 allows
deferral of any estate tax attributable to a remainder interest until six months
after the termination of the preceding interest, 324 provided interest is paid at the
general rate for unpaid taxes during the deferral period. 325 Section 6161, how-
ever, grants the Commissioner discretion to extend the time for payment of tax
on any estate up to ten years for "reasonable cause." 326 Thus, the discretionary
aspect of a section 6161 deferral supersedes any conceivable fiduciary "election"
and eliminates the need for equitable adjustment. The Connecticut statutory
power, if incorporated by reference into the instrument, authorizes the fiduciary
to defer estate tax payment under both sections and immunizes the fiduciary
from any resulting personal liability. 327 Again, the planner or draftsman should
eliminate these issues by, when possible, placing all deferral burdens and benefits
on the same group of beneficiaries. Equitable adjustment would be unreasonably
complex and expensive, and the draftsman foreseeing serious inequities and not
wishing to place all burden and benefits on one group of beneficiaries instead
should give the fiduciary broad discretion to make such elections and grant
equally broad exculpation from resulting claims.
324 I.R.C. § 6163(a).
325 I.R.C. § 6601(a).
326 I.R.C. § 6161(a)(2). Section 6163(a) states that estate tax on a "reversionary or remainder
interest" may be paid up to six months "after the termination of the precedent interest." Section
6163(b) states that "the Secretary may extend the time for payment for [an additional] reasonable
period or periods not in excess of 3 years from the expiration of the period of postponement provided
in subsection (a)." See also I.R.C. § 6165; Regs. § 20.6165-1 (1962). See generally J. PRICE, supra
note 2, §§ 12.37-12.38; H. DUBROFF & D. KAHN, supra note 175, 18.3, at 290-91 (discussing
application of "reasonable cause" standard for extension under section 6161); King, Extensions of
Time to Pay Estate Tax Pursuant to Sections 6161 and 6163, in POST MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING
285-91 (P. Asofsky ed. 1981).
327 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-100e(35)(E), (H)(West Supp. 1982).
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U. Election to Split Gifts with a Surviving Spouse on the Decedent's Final
Gift Tax Return
1. Tax Law Sources of the Election and Adjustment
Under section 6019, the fiduciary required to file the estate tax return (under
section 6018) and the decedent's final income tax return (under section 6012 or
6013) also must file any federal gift tax return that the decedent would have had
to file had he not died. 328 Under the section 2513 regulations, the fiduciary can
consent to split gifts made by the decedent or by the surviving spouse and treat
them as having been made one-half by each. 32 9 Under the unified federal estate
and gift tax system, if the decedent has made premortem taxable gifts and a
fiduciary wishes to reduce gift taxes, he can do so by obtaining the surviving
spouse's consent to split gifts. Similarly, if the surviving spouse has made gifts
prior to the decedent's death, the fiduciary can increase the decedent's gift or
estate tax liability by electing to have the surviving spouse's gifts split, thereby
causing one-half of them to be included in the decedent's final gift tax return.
These effects can be heightened by the nondeductibility on the estate tax return
of such gift taxes actually paid by the estate. 330 This problem is somewhat
analogous to that of deducting medical expenses on the decedent's final income
tax return: when the beneficiary bearing the burden of the decedent's debts is
not identical to the beneficiary bearing the burden of estate or gift taxes, the gift
splitting election can cause significant inequities. If the surviving spouse is not
a beneficiary of the estate or trust, assuming some portion of the surviving
spouse's gift tax or increasing the decedent's estate or gift tax by electing to
split gifts can violate the fiduciary's basic duty to minimize overall taxation-
if the surviving spouse is a beneficiary, the election also may violate the duty
to treat beneficiaries impartially.
2. Statutory Responses
Again, only Connecticut's statutory power, if incorporated by reference into
the instrument, specifically deals with this issue:
The fiduciary is also authorized but not required to execute and file a gift tax
return with the decedent's spouse ... [and] to consent to treat any gifts made
by the decedent's spouse as being made one-half by the decedent. The fiduciary
may pay such . . . gift taxes as are chargeable to the decedent and, in its
discretion, may pay the entire amount of such taxes. The fiduciary shall incur
no personal liability for any [such] action taken by it in good faith. 331
328 J. PRICE, supra note 2, § 12.4; Conway & Hale, supra note 3, at A-6; Wintriss, Gift-splitting
Can Increase Tax Effectiveness of Gift Program That Is Part of an Estate Plan, 9 EST. PLAN. 340,
342, 344-45 (1982).
329 Regs. § 25.2513-2(c). If the decedent spouse leaves no estate to be administered (e.g., having
transferred all assets to a revocable trust), the surviving spouse instead can elect, perhaps with no
fiduciary duties. Rev. Rul. 67-55, 1967-1 C.B. 278.
330 Regs. § 20.2053-6(d); Rev. Rul. 70-600, 1970-2 C.B. 194. See generally Wintriss, supra
note 328, at 344-45 (gift tax paid by estate of consenting spouse nondeductible because decedent
not liable for tax at date of death).
' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(C)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
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Because under section 2513(d) the fiduciary subjects himself to joint and
several liability for the surviving spouse's gift tax, this authorization to "pay
the entire amount of such taxes" apparently authorizes the fiduciary to pay the
surviving spouse's pro rata share of the tax as well, regardless of whether she
is a beneficiary. No other statutes directly discuss this problem.
3. Judicial Responses
No cases were found directly discussing this problem.
4. Drafting Solutions
There are at least three possible approaches to planning or drafting for this
election: (a) place the burden of any premortem gift taxes on those beneficiaries
who bear the estate tax burden (optimally, on the surviving spouse), (b) prohibit
the election entirely, or (c) specifically permit the election in a manner similar
to that used by the Connecticut provision (i.e., also permit the fiduciary to pay
the surviving spouse's share of the gift tax liability). If the third alternative is
chosen, the draftsman should exculpate the fiduciary and, in light of the poten-
tially donative quality of this election, should clearly indicate approval of the
fiduciary's transferring an additional economic benefit to the surviving spouse.
Fiduciaries administering estates or trusts under instruments not discussing the
election probably can safely refrain from adjustment, due to the absence of any
statutory or case law requiring it. The fiduciary also can refrain from compen-
sating the surviving spouse who suffers economic harm by electing to split gifts,
because the voluntary quality of the election would almost certainly estop her
from later claiming an adjustment.
V. Reimbursement of Settlors of Short Term Reversionary Interest Trusts for
Capital Gains Tax Payable Because of Sales of Trust Assets
A superficially similar adjustment question arises regarding fiduciary reim-
bursement of capital gains tax paid by the settlor of a short term reversionary
interest trust because of sale or other taxable exchange of principal assets. Section
673 allows income from a reversionary trust terminating at least ten years after
its creation (or upon the earlier death of the income beneficiary) to be taxed to
the income beneficiary, not to the settlor. 332 Section 677(a)(2), however, provides
that income accumulated for the settlor or gain recognized by the principal
account and eventually reverting to the settlor (e.g., capital gains) is taxed to
him in the year in which it is recognized by the trust. 33 3 Because the settlor
conceivably may not have the wherewithal to pay the tax (the trust principal is
beyond his direct reach, of course), New York and Pennsylvania courts have
approved equitable reimbursement of at least a portion of the settlor's income
332 Regs. § 1.673(a)-I (note subsection (d) regarding contingent reversions).
333 Regs. § 1.677(a)-l(b)(2); see also Regs. § 1.677(a)-1(c). See generally Berall, How to Deal
with the Capital Gains Problem of the Settlor of a Short-Term Trust, 7 EST. PLAN. 86 (1980).
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tax liability. 334 Furthermore, New York statutorily authorizes such reimburse-
ments.335 The ACPC survey, however, shows that only Nevada has a practice
of reimbursement; in the other four jurisdictions in which relevant law or practice
exists (New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and the District of Columbia),
reimbursement is neither generally required nor frequently made.33 6 Nonetheless,
an equitable reimbursement right would resemble a section 676 reversionary
interest effective during the trust term, because under section 677 the settlor
himself (not the trustee) would bear the tax liability and principal would be
distributed out to pay his liability. 337 Hence, section 673 qualification could be
lost for any portion of principal that could be reimbursed because of such settlor
tax liability. 338 Therefore, it is recommended that the instrument not only bar
reimbursement but also bar direct payment of the liability from trust principal. 339
New York draftsmen should specifically negate its statutory power. Courts facing
this issue usually should presume, because reimbursement threatens section 673
disqualification, that the settlor intended not to create such an equitable rever-
sionary right. Consensual reimbursement appears to be useless here-a con-
tractual side payment by the trust beneficiary likely would raise the same problems
as reimbursement.
340
III. CONSENSUAL ADJUSTMENTS
Neither statute nor judicial precedent nor draftsmanship offers a complete
solution to the equitable adjustment questions raised above. One further way to
dispose of adjustment claims may be to have the fiduciary and beneficiaries
negotiate an out of court settlement (perhaps taking the form of a consensual
approval of the fiduciary's account). Consensual adjustment often will be un-
I" New York: In re Cowen, 151 N.Y.L.J. 16 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County February 13, 1964); In re
Goldman, 151 N.Y.L.J. 13 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County April 7, 1964). Pennsylvania: In re French's
Estate, 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 654, 658-59 (Orphans' Ct. 1963). The French court used its equitable
powers to reimburse only that amount which the trustee would have paid had he been liable for the
tax.
135 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.1 l(a)(McKinney 1979).
336 See ACPC chart, infra at Appendix, questions 8.a. and 8.b. See also id. nn.24, 48, 55, 74.
131 See Rev. Rul. 66-161, 1966-1 C.B. 164; see also Levin & Natsui, Permitting Trust to Make
Distributions to Pay Tax on Trust Gains May Be Inadvisable, 55 J. TAX'N 372, 374-75 (1981).
Levin & Natsui state:
[W]here a nonadverse trustee has the power to sell appreciated trust assets, thereby giving
rise to capital gains, it is arguable that the [settlor] is to be treated as the owner of a portion
of the trust from its inception.
Id.
331 See Levin & Natsui, supra note 337, at 374.
331 See Berall, supra note 333, at 87 (discussing how two methods of tax payment produce same
economic result and may produce same disqualification under section 673); see also Diedrich v.
Commissioner, 102 S. Ct. 2414 (1982)(similar reasoning regarding section 2502 gift tax liability);
Levin & Natsui, supra note 337, at 375 (reimbursement or direct payment may result in grantor
being taxed on income of part of trust).
3' The only sure solution to this problem is amendment of the Code to permit such reimbursements
without sections 673 and 676 dangers.
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workable or still will involve legal proceedings, however, because (a) to be
valid, the settlement must be agreed to by beneficiaries who are ascertainable
and sui juris (a guardian ad litem may have to be appointed for minor, inca-
pacitated, contingent or unborn beneficiaries); (b) agreement without independent
legal representation of beneficiaries may be invalid and the fiduciary's legal
representative may have serious ethical concerns; (c) negotiations may be time
consuming and costly; and (d) a trust beneficiary may be barred by a spendthrift
provision from so alienating any of his interest. 34 1 Even if these difficulties are
overcome, the fiduciary or anxious beneficiary still may want to obtain court
approval of the adjustment.3 42
Consensual adjustments can be particularly useful when neither the planner
nor the transferor has anticipated the significant inequities that result from the
tax election (e.g., when unexpected large sales of appreciated assets and sub-
stantial principal expenditures have caused serious economic harm to principal
beneficiaries, and Rice-Dick-Converse adjustments have been specifically pro-
hibited). 343 When no readily apparent legal or equitable right to such adjustment
exists under the instrument (or under state law), additional problems arise: ad-
justment reasonably can be viewed as income to the originally favored or dis-
favored beneficiary, reducing the economic value of the adjustment and perhaps
necessitating further adjustments;3 44 and if adjustments are not income, they
likely are gifts by the originally favored beneficiaries to those disfavored, po-
tentially subject to federal and state gift taxes. 345
Planners and draftsmen should note that particular adjustment issues are more
or less amenable to resolution through consensual adjustment. For instance,
trapping distribution adjustments usually will benefit future principal benefici-
aries of a distributee trust, and these beneficiaries will often be contingent,
incapacitated (perhaps on account of minority) or unascertainable, thereby re-
quiring appointment of a guardian and substantial court intervention.3 46 Bene-
ficiary agreement on non-pro rata distributions, on the other hand, is frequently
encountered in estate distribution, and many states have cases or statutes spe-
cifically authorizing a personal representative to distribute in accordance with
the wishes of the beneficiaries. 
34 7
341 See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 225, at 661-63, for analogous problems
encountered in beneficiary terminations of trusts; see also E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, supra note 2,
at 370; Westfall, Nonjudicial Settlement of Trustees' Accounts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 40, 61 (1957).
342 But see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 101-20.
1" See supra note 57 and accompanying text; Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2,
1915 (discussion of whether adjustment is income or gift).
34 Moore, Conflicting Interests 1975, supra note 2, 1915. See generally I.R.C. § 2501; see
also Regs. § 25.2511-1(c).
34 See generally supra note 124. See also Regs. §§ 1.652(a)-I (general discussions of this effect),
1.662(a)-i, 1.662(c)-4 (similar discussion of sections 661 and 662).
347 E.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-912, 8 U.L.A. 281, 474 (1975)(directs executor to "abide by
the terms of" any agreement among the benficiaries "to alter the . . . amounts to which they were
entitled under the will . . . or under the laws of intestacy, in any way that they provide .... ").
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IV. CONCLUSION
Equitable adjustments are as complex and varied as the fiduciary tax elections
and nonelective procedures that give rise to them. Their intricacies and dilemmas
stem from contradictions inherent in fiduciary duty: how can a fiduciary not only
conserve property but also minimize tax burdens, treat all beneficiaries fairly
and be totally selfless in doing so? The essence of some commentary and judicial
decisions regarding these adjustments seems to be philosophical inquiry rather
than legal analysis.348 The purpose of this article has not been to further the
philosophical debate over such adjustments, however, but to inform professionals
in this area as to current precedents and practice and thereby to encourage
evolution of uniform practices. As the ACPC survey shows, in some states
beneficiaries have no practical rights and in other states fiduciaries have little
protection.3 49 Few of the major texts and treatises in the decedents' estates and
trusts area even discuss the topic. Clearly, a greater effort at analysis and policy
making must be made before uniform practices can evolve.
The development of equitable adjustment practices largely has represented a
balancing of the goals of protecting beneficiary rights and reducing administration
expense. How particular problems should be approached, however, depends
upon one's role in the fiduciary administration system:
A. Draftsmen and Planners
Draftsmen and planners should begin by considering whether, notwithstanding
possible inequities under a tax election, the cost and complexity of making an
adjustment will outweigh its value to disadvantaged beneficiaries. Most equitable
adjustments probably should be expressly prohibited. When the draftsman con-
fronts relatively simple inequities and can draft a simple solution (presumably
involving a formula and relatively infrequent adjustments), adjustments should
be required. If the fiduciary is willing to risk litigation, beneficiary strife and,
consequently, increased administrative costs, broad discretion to make such
adjustments may be given, but always with broad exculpation. The draftsman
always should consider going to the root of the inequity and directly removing
it: in some situations mentioned in this article, reserves for principal charges,
depreciation and the like could be established, and the draftsman could allocate
tax and expense burdens to remove inequities. Finally, the draftsman should
inform the client that naming a beneficiary as the fiduciary to make such elections
or adjustments creates risks of self-dealing claims. While these risks will be
acceptable to some clients, they should only be consented to after a complete
discussion with the draftsman or planner.
348 Dobris concluded his first article on equitable adjustments as follows: "Equity requires equality.
That is, equity requires harmony, classical forms, proportion. Equitable adjustments provide order
in the baroque world of postmortem planning." Dobris 1, supra note 1, at 149 (emphasis added).
See also In re Bixby's Estate, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 339, 295 P.2d 68, 75 (1956)("such a rule
commends itself to the conscience of the court as one under which no one is injured by an unjust
encroachment on his inheritance") (emphasis added).
349 See generally ACPC chart, infra at Appendix.
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B. Advisors of Fiduciaries
The threshold problem for the average advisor will be insuring that the fiduciary
consults with him about current and future equitable adjustment questions. As-
suming such consultation occurs, the advisor will find few helpful precedents
on equitable adjustments, not only because few courts and legislatures have
examined the problem, but because those courts that have discussed equitable
adjustments have not always taken a well-reasoned approach. In some states,
statutes or cases require adjustments, while in a few states adjustments are
explicitly prohibited. Sometimes the instrument will direct or prohibit adjustment.
In any event, if the fiduciary can reasonably infer transferor intent not to adjust,
that intent should be followed. In the absence of any such guidance, fiduciaries
should approach claims for adjustment conservatively and do nothing unless
precedent or statute requires it. They should be aware of what other local fi-
duciaries are doing and have done in the past about such elections. The fiduciary
should communicate with as many of the beneficiaries as possible and whenever
possible obtain their consent to the adjustment decision. The fiduciary should
not discourage beneficiaries from seeking independent advice; he should welcome
it. He also should welcome advice from the court, by filing accounts after the
decision has been made and possibly by obtaining court orders in advance, when
beneficiary agreement cannot be reached. Finally and most importantly, the
prudent fiduciary must make a suitable record of considerations leading to the
adjustment decision: this record should include analyses of relevant tax statutes
and estate or trust law involved, calculations of probable economic effects on
beneficiaries and copies of letters to beneficiaries describing the approach chosen.
C. Judges
Judges also should enter this area with caution. They should review in detail
the Converse case: its pragmatic analysis of the many consequences of such
adjustments takes into account not only possible beneficiary harm but also pos-
sible fiduciary harm.350 As a general rule, courts should not intervene in estate
and trust accounting to reallocate beneficiaries' interests if no real choice existed
for the fiduciary. The focus of their analysis should not be on whether some
conceivable economic inequity resulted from the operation of the tax laws, but
on whether the fiduciary had any choice about how the economic effects of a
transaction would be passed on to beneficiaries. The Dick approach should be
followed to the extent that it prohibits equitable adjustments when, as a practical
matter, no election was available to the fiduciary.35' Judges should also bear in
mind that draftsmen, planners and fiduciary advisors often will have discussed
such issues at length with transferors and, even if such discussions do not appear
on the face of a dispositive instrument, every attempt should be made to respect
350 New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Converse, 373 Mass. 639, 643-44, 369 N.E.2d 982,
984 (1977).
351 In re Estate of Dick, 29 Misc. 2d 648, 218 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1961). See
supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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an explicit or reasonably implicit intent not to make adjustments. Finally, in
deciding such questions, courts should clearly state their approach, whenever
possible in terms of their own or sister state precedents, and follow it in each
subsequent case; in this way harm to clients for whom dispositive instruments
have already been drafted will be minimized.
D. Legislatures
It is the role of the legislatures to balance the interests of fiduciaries and
beneficiaries on a long term basis. State legislatures clearly cannot lessen the
complexity of fiduciary tax elections. Similarly, it is beyond the resources of
most to reconsider systematically the basic rules of fiduciary accounting set down
in, for instance, the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act.352 Such uniform
state legislation should be revised to solve the most serious of the equitable
adjustment problems discussed in this article. In the absence of new uniform
legislation, however, other state legislatures should carefully review the Con-
necticut tax election and equitable adjustment statute and discuss with fiduciaries,
bar associations, other professional groups and consumer groups the possibility
of enacting some or all of its provisions.353
152 See supra note 9.
353 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
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THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PROBATE COUNSEL
Compiled by
Frank S. Berall
Hartford, Connecticut
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This chart and its footnotes set forth each state's law and local practice (where,
as in most jurisdictions, there is no case or statutory law). Instruments may
either authorize equitable adjustments, forbid them or say nothing, in which case
local law or practice will apply.
The chart was compiled in a joint project between the American College of
Probate Counsel and the Committee on Income of Estates and Trusts, Section
of Taxation, American Bar Association. The chart entries for each state are based
on an opinion received from a reporter for that state. With rare exceptions,
reporters have been Fellows of the College from that state. Footnotes to the chart
are, for the most part, verbatim comments of each reporter. Neither the College
nor the individual reporters assume any responsibility for the accuracy of the
information contained in the Appendix.
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FOOTNOTES
Alabama
1. While there appears to be no general practice with respect to making any adjustments, some
of the more sophisticated attorneys and corporate fiduciaries will make adjustments in certain in-
stances. Instruments drawn by more experienced practitioners give fiduciaries discretion to make
adjustments, but the vast majority of instruments have no such provisions.
Arizona
2. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-3715 (Uniform Probate Code) allows a personal representative to
allocate items of income or expense either to estate income or principal as permitted or provided
by law. Ordinarily, no adjustment is made, but usually this is discussed with the beneficiary.
3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-7302, the Prudent Man Rule, provides that if a person has special
skills or expertise, he has a duty to use them. In this situation no adjustment would be made nor
would the personal representative be liable, unless it was imprudent to so act.
4. Should income be realized, it might be a violation of the Arizona Prudent Man Rule.
Arkansas
5. The Arkansas Uniform Principal & Income Act contains some general language giving a
fiduciary latitude in the way he charges receipts and expenditures to achieve equity between the
income and principal interests. Arkansas recognizes a fiduciary's duty of impartiality between
multiple or successive trust beneficiaries. Alexander v. Alexander, 262 Ark. 612, 561 S.W. 2d 59
(1978). In the absence of a provision contained in many wills and trusts concerning equitable
adjustments, the duty of a fiduciary to make such adjustments as a result of tax elections is unclear.
6. No adjustment appears to be required. It is not common practice to make adjustments absent
a provision in the governing instrument either requiring or authorizing them.
7. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2909.2, dealing with distribution of assets in satisfaction of a
pecuniary marital deduction provision in kind at federal estate tax values or any values other than
date of distribution or allocation ones, requires that the assets be fairly representative of appreciation
and depreciation, although the repeal of carryover basis has minimized the problem caused by
provisions in instruments authorizing distributions of assets in kind without reference to income tax
bases.
8. It is fairly common to include some provisions in the governing instrument regarding equitable
adjustments. The usual approach is not to require such adjustments, but rather to authorize the
fiduciary to make them, in its discretion.
California
9. Principal must be made whole if administration expenses are taken as income tax deductions.
Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 295 P.2d 68 (1956). Generally there is no adjustment made
for losses except those deductible for estate tax purposes.
10. Some practitioners believe that a Bixby type of adjustment should be made.
11. Despite the absence of clear authority, under CAL. C.C. §§ 730.13(a)(7) and (c)(4) (The
Revised Uniform Principal & Income Act), it is arguable that tax paid by a trustee is on "ordinary
income." The income beneficiary is entitled to net probate income (See Estate of de Laveaga, 50
Cal. 2d 480, 326 P.2d 129 (1958) ). While probate income may be determined in the estate, the
trustee also has power to determine net income. The general practice is to charge the tax paid on
"trapping distributions" to trust income. However, there are lawyers who do not follow these
practices, while under the Bixby rationale (see footnote 9) an equitable adjustment is necessary to
prevent corpus depletion.
12. While no adjustment is generally made in practice, if the fiduciary is also the beneficiary,
California courts would probably require an adjustment, although if the election is made by an
independent fiduciary, the ultimate decision is uncertain.
13. Cal. Probate Codes §§ 970 et seq.
Colorado
14. Some fiduciaries will make a "Bixby-Warms Adjustment" in this situation to make principal
whole (see Howard Parks Probate and Practice Manual), although it is of dubious value to have
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done this, absent specific provision authorizing or directing the personal representative to achieve
the greatest tax savings. However, others make no adjustment, since most instruments do not require
any adjustment for this, and instead take the various brackets (estate tax, estate's income tax and
beneficiary's income tax) into consideration when deciding where to take the elective deductions.
15. Although non-pro rata distributions are now authorized to be made by statute (C.R.S. 1973,
15-1-804(2)(u) as amended by Section 20, House Bill 1230, 1979) effective for estates of persons
dying on or after July 1, 1979, a fiduciary has a duty "to act reasonably and equitably with due
regard for his obligations and responsibilities toward the interests of beneficiaries and creditors, the
estate or trust involved and the purposes thereof and with due regard for the manner in which men
of prudence, discretion, and intelligence would act in the management of the property of another."
Any non-pro rata distribution would place a burden on the fiduciary to satisfy the beneficiaries or
the Court that he had acted properly. Non-pro rata distributions are generally not made, unless the
beneficiaries request it, or where tax situations might warrant it (getting low basis stock to a charity).
These distributions open up all kinds of problems, including possible gift tax consequences.
16. It is appropriate to consider the tax consequences resulting from the elections available to
the trustee of a distribution from a qualified plan. If the fiduciary is receiving the benefits in his
individual capacity, there would be a duty on him to make the principal whole by virtue of the
increases in the estate tax, since he has a conflict. Better the named fiduciary should waive acting
as such. On the other hand, if they are received by the fiduciary in his fiduciary capacity, then
presumably, he would make the election that is in his best interest, regardless of estate tax. If the
fiduciary makes the election less favorable to him, then the personal representative might agree to
some equitable adjustments.
17. Some fiduciaries regard income in respect of a decedent as principal to be retained, whereas
others make distribution of it to income beneficiaries. This seems the more reasonable approach,
despite a lack of uniform treatment and the existence of estate tax attributable to the IRD.
18. C.R.S. 1973, 15-1-405(2) states: Absent any law or direction in the instrument to the contrary,
the fiduciary shall determine income and principal "in accordance with what is reasonable and
equitable in view of the interests of those entitled to income as well as those entitled to principal."
C.R.S. 1973, 15-1-804(2)(s) grants to fiduciaries the specific power "to determine all matters of
estate and trust accounting as the fiduciary deems to be proper and equitable."
C.R.S. 1973, 15-1-804(2)(u) grants to the fiduciary the specific power to make non-pro rata
distributions in accordance with language cited above, but again the exercise of both of these latter
powers is subject to the fiduciary's duty to act reasonably and equitably in the manner stated above.
The following are examples of provisions used in granting powers to the fiduciaries in wills and
trust agreements:
"Determine what is income and what is principal, and all other accounting matters, not otherwise
controlled by statute."
"Set aside from income reserves for taxes, assessments, . . . and for equalization of payments
to or for beneficiaries."
"Make elections which are available under any tax law in accordance with the fiduciary's
judgment as to the best interests of the beneficiaries as a group, . . and offsetting adjustments,
if any, to income and principal accounts or to distributive shares shall be made solely in the
discretion of the fiduciary."
"Except as otherwise provided herein, divide and distribute my estate in cash and/or in kind
with shares differently or similarly composed at values. determined by the fiduciary."
Connecticut
19. Connecticut's Fiduciary Powers Act includes as one of the powers which may be incorporated
by reference in a will or trust instrument an authorization to make various tax elections dealing with
the alternate valuation date and the deduction of administration and other expenses, without being
required to make any adjustments between income and principal or between the property interests
passing to any beneficiaries which may be affected on account of these elections, except that where
one or more residuary legatees of a will containing a pre-residuary marital or orphans deduction
formula is a charity, and the fiduciary elects to treat administration and other expenses wholly or
partly as income tax deductions, thus increasing the federal estate taxes, an amount equal to the
difference in the estate taxes shall be reimbursed to principal from income. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-100e(35)(B).
Occasionally, Fairfield County corporate fiduciaries are inclined to make adjustments, if the
amounts involved are particularly large.
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20. Adjustment ordinarily only made where amounts involved substantial, with manner and timing
varying. Income may be used to reimburse principal over a period of time to minimize the distortion
to income.
21. In rare instances, unequal principal distributions have been intentionally made to pass estate
income to a low bracket beneficiary, with an adjustment made by having higher bracket beneficiaries
reimburse the lower bracket one by the amount of the increase in the lower bracket beneficiary's
tax.
21a. Connecticut's Fiduciary Powers Act (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-100e(35)(G) ), which may
be incorporated by reference, permits various tax elections with respect to qualified plans, but makes
no provision for equitable adjustments.
Delaware
22. A non-pro rata distribution would not be made, absent an agreement by the beneficiaries
concerning the distribution.
23. Prevailing local practice would require the fiduciary to consider the tax consequences of any
election and to act impartially, with a view to a minimization of tax for all beneficiaries.
,District of Columbia
24. If unusual circumstances seem to warrant it, equitable adjustments may be made in certain
cases, but the usual practice is not to make equitable adjustments.
25. A somewhat unusual adjustment, known as the Slocum adjustment, requires that income
collected on assets used to pay debts and legacies be transferred from income to principal unless
waived (as frequently done) in the instrument.
26. While no standard practice exists, most instruments are either silent or specifically prohibit
equitable adjustments.
Florida
27. Florida case law recognized that a Warms-type adjustment should be made under certain
circumstances. In re Kent's Estate, 23 Fla. Supp. 133 (Palm Beach County Judge's Court 1964).
In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Dade Count, Judge's Court 1965) (not reported elsewhere).
Georgia
28. Although there is some practice of transferring from income to principal an amount equal to
the additional estate tax incurred by reason of the non-deduction of expenses on the estate tax return
at the time of the final distribution, some fiduciaries would do so only where there are conflicting
interests and with the advice of counsel or with consent of all beneficiaries.
a. It is probably safe to assert that the majority of Georgia attorneys are simply unaware
of the problem.
b. In general, Georgia probate law is relatively unsophisticated, primarily because of the
ability of Georgia testators to remove their estates from direct court supervision of any sort
by testamentary provisions relieving executors and trustees from all reporting requirements;
and it is the all but universal practice of attorneys so to provide. Also, it is the exception,
rather than the rule, for a Georgia Probate Judge to have legal training, so that even where
no such relief is given, court oversight of the acts of fiduciaries does not necessarily provide
any guidance in matters of this complexity.
c. It is the practice of the more sophisticated attorneys to provide the widest possible
discretion to executors and trustees to make, or to refrain from making, equitable adjustments;
and, since the models for most Georgia wills and trusts are drawn from form books written
for the major banks by the most sophisticated of our estate planners, this practice has become
general.
d. In general, manipulation of Subchapter J to achieve optimum tax consequences is a
rarity in estate administration in Georgia, so that the necessity for equitable adjustments
arising from such actions is equally rare.
Hawaii
28a. Adjustments are made where the amount involved is sufficient so that someone would object
if no adjustment is made.
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Idaho
28b. Idaho Code Section 68-1002 (Uniform Principal & Income Act) authorizes the trust instru-
ment to make provision for allocations and adjustments between principal and income. If there is
no provision in the instrument or if the act itself does not contain instructions in a specific situation,
then the Trustee is to act "in accordance with what is reasonable and equitable in view of the
interests of those entitled to income as well as of those entitled to principal,, and in view of the
manner in which men of ordinary prudence, discretion and judgment would act in the management
of their own affairs."
28c. This is beyond the degree of sophistication of most Idaho practitioners so probably would
go unnoticed in most cases. However, in view of the duties described in Idaho Code Section 68-
1002 (see footnote above), the practice would be to make an adjustment if there is a significant
effect on the interests of the parties when the fiduciary is aware that the disparity actually exists.
28d. None. Note: However, under Idaho Code Section 68-108 (Uniform Trustees & Powers Act),
if an individual's duty as Trustee and his individual interest conflict regarding the exercise of a Trust
power, the power may only be exercised by Court authorization upon petition of the Trustee. If a
Trustee is also beneficiary of a Trust, it appears that a decision under some of these questions must
be made only after consultation with the Court.
Illinois
29. Absent a provision excusing adjustments, a Warms adjustment would probably be recognized
for administration expenses taken as income tax deductions. James, Illinois Probate Law & Practice,
1975 Pocket Parts §§ 43.104(b) and 289.8, since beneficiaries in a particular class are considered
entitled to equal treatment. In re Estate of Comiskey, 24 Il1. App. 2d 199, 164 N. E. 2d 535 (1960).
Since administration expenses are chargeable from principal (ILL. REV. STAT. 1979, Ch. 30,
§ 163), there seems to be a consensus that principal beneficiaries should receive the benefit of the
tax deduction attributable to these expenses.
30. Such a non-pro rata distribution would have to be authorized by instrument or agreed to by
beneficiaries. If authorized, no adjustment is probably required in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion and ascertainable damages, while if not authorized, an aggrieved beneficiary could com-
plain.
31. A fiduciary should either obtain an agreement or court instructions. See Roe v. Farrell, 69
Ill. 2d 525, 372 N.E. 2d 662 (1978), which establishes equitable apportionment for non-probate
assets in Illinois.
32. Adjustments are often made if a distribution is made to a low income bracket residuary legatee
in a year of high D.N.I. and to a wealthy legatee in a short final year of an estate with low D.N.I.
(or excess deductions).
33. Adjustments are almost always excused or prohibited by will. Even when they are not, none
are usually made except in rare adverse interest cases involving large sums.
Iowa
34. Trapped income is allocated to principal and taxes are paid out of it without adjustment.
A fiduciary should obtain beneficiary consents or seek court approval after court ordered
notice to all beneficiaries.
35. Problems are beginning to arise when § 2032A property is distributed.
Kentucky
35a. May be said to be required by an extension of the holding in Hurst v. First Kentucky Trust
Company, 560 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. 1978), but seldom, if ever, is any adjustment made in these
circumstances and few, if any, trust officers in Kentucky appear to be concerned about it.
35b. Perhaps no such duty exists (see Brodie v. DeVatz, 556 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1977). At any
rate seldom, if ever, is any duty recognized.
35c. A fiduciary must deal fairly and impartially with all beneficiaries. Hurst v. First Kentucky
Trust Company, 560 S.W.2d 819, 821.(Ky. 1978); McBride v. McBride, 262 Ky. 452, 90 S.W.2d
736, 741 (1936). This rule dictates that adjustments be made whenever inequities would otfierwise
result.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 36, No. 3
SECTION OF TAXATION
Louisiana
36. Article 1573 of the Louisiana Civil Code generally prohibits an executor from determining
how an estate is to be divided. This prohibition may prevent the executor from making a tax election
which will affect the portions of the estate divided among the heirs or legatees. Therefore tax-related
elections are generally made with the approval of all competent parties.
37. Principal charges should not be made against income without the approval of the income
beneficiary.
37a. Until 1982 Article 1573 of the Civil Code was understood to prevent non-pro-rata distri-
butions, unless the recipients consented thereto. The 1982 revision allows the executor to select
assets to fund formula marital deduction bequests, and it may be applicable to other bequests as
well.
37b. Unless the decedent stipulates otherwise the party receiving the qualified plan benefit will
owe the estate tax under the Louisiana Estate Tax Apportionment law.
Maryland
38. Maryland Statutes, Estates & Trusts, § 11-106(a), requires reimbursement of principal from
income when there is an election to treat administration expenses as either income or estate tax
deductions, and the fiduciary elects to treat them as income tax deductions, unless the instrument
provides otherwise. However, § 11-106(b) specifies the adjustment is unnecessary where a maximum
marital deduction provision exists in an instrument, whether the marital gift is increased by an
election to take administration expenses as income tax deduction or because of an alternate valuation
date election.
39. Maryland Statutes, Estates & Trusts, § 14-210 seems to require this result.
Massachusetts
40. New England Merchants National Bank v. Converse, 373 Mass. 639 (1977), held that no
such adjustment was required to be made by a fiduciary. The court observed that it is not the usual
practice of Massachusetts fiduciaries to do so. The court also stated, however, that its decision is
not intended to question such adjustments made by a fiduciary in accordance with its own established
practice, or an adjustment made for the first time by a fiduciary "on some intelligent basis." There
is no rule requiring such an adjustment nor is one made as a matter of practice. The consensus of
those practitioners polled was that the problem should be avoided by proper drafting.
41. Practice of the responding firm is to make only pro rata distributions.
42. Whether any such duty exists was not ascertainable.
Mississippi
43. Expenses or losses are payable from estate income and any net income remaining is distrib-
utable to the beneficiaries.
Missouri
44. No consensus or practice, majority of those polled believe no adjustment necessary.
45. Problem frequently avoided by making equalizing distributions to all beneficiaries or by
timing distributions to ameliorate the income tax burden. If not, no adjustment thought necessary.
Furthermore, in Missouri, under Bohan, 456 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1972), a partial distribution to a
residuary legatee does not carry D.N.I. with it, Treasury regulations to the contrary notwithstanding.
46. Absent a contrary provision or an agreement of the parties, each asset is distributed pro rata,
and this is required by metropolitan probate courts.
Montana
47. Questions of this nature are rarely considered and are of little concem to practitioners.
Nebraska
47a. The Nebraska Principal and Income Act, R.R.S. Sections 30-3101 to 30-3115, inclusive,
became effective January 1, 1981. Prior to 1981, there was little, if any, reference to equitable
adjustments in the cases, and no standard practice regarding such adjustments. The provisions of
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the Principal and Income Act give directions for identifying receipts, which will govern the fiduciary,
and may require adjustments to be made.
Nevada
48. Fiduciary ordinarily has absolute power to make decisions with respect to equitable adjustments
on an ad hoc basis so long as done reasonably.
New Jersey
49. A New Jersey court rule, 4:87-2(b)(5), requires a statement, in accounting the actions of
"allocation" where principal expenses have been taken as income tax deductions, but there is no
indication of just what, if any, adjustments would be required. No statute, case or rule requires any
adjustment to be made. The prevailing practice (with, however, some dissents) is that no adjustments
are made.
50. While most practitioners give broad discretion, allowing fiduciaries to make one or more of
the various elections, they then indicate that there is to be no adjustment between income and
principal because of any such election.
New York
51. Beneficiaries receiving income tax benefits must reimburse principal in an amount equal to
the additional estate taxes payable because of the executor's election under Matter of Warms, 140
N.Y.S. 2d 169 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1955), as codified in N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 11-1.2(a). A provision
in the instrument to the contrary may override this requirement.
52. Several cases are inconclusive as to whether an adjustment is actually required, leaving the
picture somewhat confused; thus New York fiduciaries tend not to make such adjustments as a matter
of practice even when the instrument contains a provision allowing apportionment of taxes between
principal and income. Matter of Dick, 29 Misc. 2d 648, 218 N.Y.S. 2d 182 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1961); Matter of Adler, N.Y.L.J. (June 21, 1974 p. 15) (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co.); Matter of Lecompte,
52 Misc. 2d 549, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 208 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1966); and Matter of Pross, 90 Misc.
2d 895, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 309 (Surf. Ct. West. Co. 1977).
53. Matter of Holloway, 68 Misc. 2d 361, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 865 (Sunr. Ct. Nassau Co. 1972),
reversing on rehearing, 67 Misc. 2d 132, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 534 (Sun'. Ct, Nassau Co. 1971), first
imposed such an adjustment, although Matter of Coe, 80 Misc. 2d 374, 363 N.Y.S. 2d 265 (Sun.
Ct. Nassau Co. 1975), did not give it retroactivity. The adjustment requires reimbursement of
principal by income beneficiaries in an amount equal to income taxes payable when a principal
distribution carries out taxable income from an estate. Prior to these decisions, many New York
fiduciaries followed the practice of making this adjustment, and it is now almost universally followed
although there has been no codification of its rule.
54. Absent authorization in the instrument or consent of the beneficiaries, New York fiduciaries
generally seek to avoid making non-pro rata distributions from an estate. Matter of Mann, 4 Misc.
2d 387, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 348 (Sunr. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1956), held that the power to distribute in kind is
limited by the obligation to deal fairly and equitably with all legatees.
55. N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 7-1.11 permits distribution by a fiduciary of the capital gains tax paid by
the grantor. This statute was enacted in response to Matter of Cowen, N.Y.L.J. (February 13, 1964
p. 16), and Matter of Goldman, N.Y.L.J. (April 7, 1964 p. 13), which directed reimbursement
from the trust of the grantor for capital gains taxes paid by him on gains taxable to him but allocable
to corpus, where the instrument was silent with respect to reimbursement. The courts shifted the
tax burden from the settlor to the corpus, which actually benefitted by the gains under equitable
principles. The statute was then enacted to provide that a trustee of an express trust may reimburse
the settlor from corpus for any income taxes paid by him on any portion of the corpus, unless the
instrument provides to the contrary or there is a vested remainder passing to a charity or other named
entities.
56. N.Y.E.P.T.L. § ll-l.2(b)(l) provides that, in the absence of a controlling will provision,
no adjustment need to be made (i) where a marital deduction bequest is increased by an election to
deduct expenses for income tax (rather than estate tax) purposes, and (ii) where such a bequest is
increased or decreased by a valuation date election. Many New York wills do not mandate adjustments
in these situations and some wills specifically prohibit such adjustments. The valuation date issue
addressed in the above section is related to the issue raised by Question No. 5, above; i.e., the
valuation date election will often affect the amount of estate tax and the income tax basis of inherited
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 36, No. 3
SECTION OF TAXATION
property as well as the size of the marital deduction bequest. While the statute does not address the
estate tax or basis questions, they are really just corollaries of the "size-of-the-marital-share" issue,
and the statute clearly resolves the latter in favor of no adjustment, in the absence of a contrary
direction from the testator.
A series of New York cases has considered the question of how income taxes, either on ordinary
income or capital gains, should be charged as between charitable and non-charitable interests during
estate and trust administration; i.e., whether such taxes should be treated as administration expenses
and thus be shared ratably by all beneficiaries or whether an adjustment should be made to exonerate
the charitable interests from taxation. The only case requiring an adjustment of this sort is Matter
of Eidlitz, 21 Misc. 2d 218, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 711 (Suff. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1959), but the most recent
case, Hewlett, 77 Misc. 2d 38, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (Suff. Ct. Nassau Co. 1974), disapproves of
the Eidlitz result and indicates that no such adjustment should be made in the absence of legislative
action. See also Matter of Hanover Bank, N.Y.L.J. (May 12, 1969 p. 2) (no adjustment).
57. Most forms provide that determinations are to be made in the fiduciary's sole and/or absolute
discretion without explicitly imposing a standard of reasonableness. This appears to limit the grounds
for objections by beneficiaries to lack of good faith. See Scott on Trusts (3rd Ed.), § 187.2.
North Carolina
58. Some corporate fiduciaries re-calculate the estate tax and reimburse principal from income
(a Warms adjustment), while others make an adjustment only if a substantial distortion would
otherwise occur.
59. In exceptional situations of obvious inequities (uncommon occurrences), adjustments are made
to remedy the inequity.
60. Some fiduciaries make no adjustment because they consider the capital gains tax to be one
on principal.
61. Pro rata distributions are made unless the instrument provides otherwise or the beneficiaries
agree. In such cases no adjustments are made on account of the non-pro rata distributions.
62. If, as a result of an election, plan benefits were includable for estate tax purposes and the
instrument had no tax allocation clause, the proceeds could be subject to contribution for their
proportionate share of federal and North Carolina death taxes. See First National Bank of Shelby v.
Dixon, 38 N.C. App. 430, 248 S.E. 2d 416 (1978).
63. Where an inequity is of consequence, an adjustment will be made.
North Dakota
64. The immediate (estate) tax is reduced unless tax brackets are substantially different, since
future asset values are uncertain.
65. Averaging income tax rate for income and discretionary distributions to beneficiaries.
Ohio
66. There is no uniform practice, since most instruments deal with this point. Because of the
weight of authority in other jurisdictions and because it is "good estate planning," if an adjustment
is made, the amount equal to the increase in estate tax resulting from taking expenses as income
tax deductions would be transferred from income to principal. However, no such election would be
made if the marital share would be increased and the decedent leaves a second wife and children
by a first wife. If, however, there is a compatible family situation and expenses are utilized as
income tax deductions, B trust income would be transferred to principal.
67. Corporate fiduciaries would not make a non-pro rata distribution and would only consider
such a distribution if it was approved by the trust committee of the bank and then only if the disparity
in basis was small (less than 10%).
Oregon
68. Adjustment would be made where the amount is substantial.
69. No, but such a distribution would not be made without the consent of the beneficiary adversely
affected.
70. Fiduciary usually given discretion to determine whether or not to make adjustment, except
that instrument may require adjustment where marital or charitable deduction would be adversely
affected by the election made.
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Pennsylvania
70a. In Bell Estate, 7 Pa. Fid. Rep. I (O.C. Chester Co. 1956), affd on another issue, 393 Pa.
623, 144 A.2d 843 (1958), an Orphans' Court judge followed the "trend of thought" (particularly
as illustrated by California authority) that equity between the parties required that principal be
compensated by income for the increase in federal estate tax. Absent controlling appellate court
authority, most lawyers seem not to follow Bell, recognizing, however, that in the case of antagonism
between the income and principal interests a court would be likely to make an equitable adjustment
in the resolution of a dispute.
70b. Rice Estate, 8 Pa. D.&C. 2d 379, 6 Pa. Fid. Rep. 225 (O.C. Montgomery Co. 1956), held
that equitable principles required income to reimburse principal for a capital gains tax which would
not have been payable had principal charges been deductible against the capital gains. Such ad-
justments are not normally made absent antagonism among beneficiaries.
70c. Absent any Pennsylvania authority on the subject, the more knowledgeable practitioners and.
institutions use trapping distributions to spread income among beneficiaries (including trusts) to
minimize overall income taxes and allow the income tax burden to fall on principal to the extent a
trapping distribution gives rise to tax.
70d. If the governing instrument is silent, most practitioners and institutions use care in timing
principal and income distributions to avoid inequitable results. Salesky Estate, 15 Pa. Fid. Rep. 213
(O.C. Montgomery 1965), required an adjustment (equal to lesser of the estate's income tax savings
or the distributee's tax burden) where a wife.elected to take against a will and received a principal
distribution which carried out D.N.I.
70e. A grantor of an irrevocable 1910 trust obtained reimbursement from the trust for her capital
gains tax. French Trust, 61 Pa. D.& C. 2d 654, 23 Pa. Fid. Rep. 296 (O.C. Philadelphia 1963).
The court held that equity required a reimbursement but, for administrative convenience, measured
the reimbursement by the capital gains tax the trust would have paid had it been taxable on the gain.
Rhode Island
71. Only where large amounts are involved is an adjustment made, usually after consultation
with counsel.
72. The Holloway adjustment is sometimes made before the executor closes the estate, usually
when the executors and the trustees are the same. See also Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Sanders, 84 R.I. 347 (1956).
73. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Sanders, 84 R.I. 347 (1956), would probably be interpreted
as requiring an adjustment, since it held that a charitable beneficiary with share of residue received
estate income without reduction for federal income taxes on accumulated estate income where there
were other common non-charitable beneficiaries. The adjustment would be made only .if the amount
were material.
74. Lower courts have approved an adjustment in an accounting under which trust principal
reimburses the grantor at least for a portion of the tax incurred by him.
75. In estates over about $1,000,000 the instrument is often drafted so that an adjustment is
required. Usually the instrument provides that no adjustment is to be made. In some cases discretion
is conferred on the fiduciary with respect to an adjustment.
South Carolina
76. Absolute discretion is frequently given in South Carolina wills. However, adjustments to
compensate for the consequences of tax decisions or elections are not presently being made as a
matter of practice. Apparently, the inequities which result from these tax decisions and elections
are largely being ignored.
South Dakota
77. On the infrequent occasions when any of these issues arise, each lawyer or fiduciary decides
them on a case by case basis.
Tennessee
78. Due to lack of statutory authority to make an adjustment, Tennessee practitioners and fidu-
ciaries appear to be reluctant, but believe there should be a statutory provision allowing one.
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Texas
79. Equitable adjustments are made very infrequently. Situations arising which would lead to
these being necessary are generally avoided by knowledgeable practitioners and overlooked by the
rest.
Vermont
7 9a. I am not aware of any "practice" with regard to equitable adjustments in Vermont. They
are not required by statute or case law. It is not uncommon for a Will or Trust Instrument to
specifically exonerate the fiduciary from any liability in the good faith exercise or non-exercise of
any discretionary power conferred by the Instrument or by federal or State law. This implies that
the draftsman or fiduciary fears that some day our Courts may impose liability for failure to make
equitable adjustments.
Wyoming
80. Since Wyoming Probate Law is derived originally from that of California, several Wyoming
cases have acknowledged that California precedents will be given great weight. Thus, when a
deduction is taken on an income tax return, the income beneficiary's share would probably be reduced
to restore principal as if a deduction had been taken on the estate tax return, in harmony with
California's Bixby case. Other income/principal problems, such as allocation of stock dividends or
non-taxable dividends to the income beneficiary, may receive similar treatment. Knowledgeable
practitioners draft provisions dispensing with the need for adjustments and granting the fiduciaries
discretion to handle these questions; most practitioners overlook these questions in practice.
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